

The problem of the Rohingya Refugees during 1991-1994 and the International Situation

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This study focuses on the issue of the problem of Rohingya refugees during 1991-1994 and the UN position on it, in this era the displacement of approximately (250,000 - 268,000) Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, because of the burmese policy of injustice and arbitrariness towards this minority, and this problem was divided into two phases, the first of which began during (1991) - 1992), which was in the form of human waves fleeing from Arakan Burmese to Bangladesh, and was welcomed by the Bangladeshi government with a spacious, but because of their increasing numbers with the weakness of Bangladesh's potential, the problem began to appear on the horizon, and suffered by Burma, Bangladesh and the Rohingya themselves, Burma did not welcome them, and Bangladesh After the Bangladeshi appeal, the United Nations moved through unhcr, mediated between the two governments, and succeeded in reaching an agreement (safety and voluntary return agreement) on April 28, 1992, in which Burma agreed to receive The refugees, while ensuring their safety, while Bangladesh stressed that the refugees are not forced to return to their homeland, until the necessary guarantees are provided to them, and agreed on a time limit for their return estimated in the whole year, and as the first batch approached, there was a misunderstanding between the Burmese government and UNHCR, because Burma refused to return Unhcr has withdrawn itself from the convention, and this delay increased pressure on the Bangladeshi government, which had to force some refugees to return in secret, and after denouncing it, the latter stopped their returns, thus ending the first phase of the return of the refugees. After negotiations between Burma, Bangladesh and UNHCR, the safety agreement was renewed and the second phase began on February 1, 1993. New, to get rid of the government's arbitrariness against them.

Key words: *Rohingya, Burma, Bangladesh, UNHCR, UNITED Nations.*

Introduction

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma) is located in South-East Asia, bordered to the south by the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, to the northeast by China, to the east of Laos, and to the south by Thailand to the southeast, bordered by Bangladesh, and its border sits in the northwest at the border of India, and the city of Rangoon is the capital. The country, Burmese is its official language, and most of its population is Buddhist, and in 2018 it is estimated that 60,584,500 people, including the Rohingya minority, are estimated to have an area of about 676,578 km², divided into seven regions and seven states, and most of the population inhabits the capital, Rangoon, and on the one hand, Ethnicity, Burma consists of eight main races called 'great national races', namely (Burman, Mon, Karen, Shan, Kachin, Chin, Rakhine), and about 135 other races, Chin has (53) branches, Shan (33) branches, and Kachin is distributed to (12) branches, The Karen is divided into (11) branches, the Burman (9) branches, the Karenni the same number, the Rakhine is divided into (7) branches, and the least of them is the Mon, who have one branch, and the majority of the population of Burma is ethnic Burmese, who make up (68%) of the population, all of which are officially recognized by the government, except the Rohingya, they are not included, because of the hatred of the ruling regime, which ignored historical and political realities, dealt with the Rohingya on a religious basis only, considered Islam a danger to them (Yusuf, 2018), and did not officially recognize the term 'Rohingya', as Bengali immigrants, who entered Burma during the After the British colonial era (1824-1948) (Initiatives, 2015).

In terms of religious foundation in Burma, Buddhists (89%) are of the total population, Christians (4%) (Baptist 3%, Roman Catholics 1%) are members of the population, Muslims are involved for themselves, and spirituals (1%) are Buddhists (1%), and there are (2%) either atheists or without religion, and there are more than one in the country. 200) Used language and dialect from some ethnic minorities (Mohajan, 2018).

The influx of Arakan Muslims from India and Bengal continued during the 15th and 17th centuries, which increased the Islamic presence in Arakan, and then escalated further after the abductions of Buddhists (Mag) and Portuguese slave traders to large numbers of Bengalis (Muslims), to work in The Kaladan Valley, then donated as slaves in some temples and monasteries, including the Holy Shrine of The Mah-Muni, and therefore this Islamic diversity is the basis of the Rohingya in Arakan (Islam, 2018). The founding of the 15th-century Maruk Yu Kingdom, influenced by Islam and Muslim kings, was clearly an important turning point in the entry of waves of Muslims to Arakan.

After Burma became a part of Burma in 1948, and U Nu became president, the Burmese government initially treated the Rohingya as the rest of the ethnic groups, considering them Burmese citizens despite not being officially recognized as an ethnic group, and shortly after,



the Rohingya demanded The Burmese government on the importance of officially recognizing their identity, but the government did not respond to their demand, which prompted some supporters of the Mujahideen movement to launch attacks on some Burmese military positions, to which the government responded in 1954 by launching a military operation called 'Operation Monsoon', and defeated them And their band (Islam, 2018).

Despite the military defeat, the Mujahideen movement achieved important results at the political level, the first time Burmese Prime Minister U Nu stated that 'the Rohingya people are an indigenous ethnic group and the rights from which they were denied will be returned to some extent', and then agreed in early May 1961 to form a special zone called 'Administration' The Mayu Frontier Administration, which includes Mongdaw, Buthidwang and some parts of Rathidang, mostly Rohingya, was run separately from the Buddhist majority in Arakan, and the residents of the May administration confirmed that the Rohingya had an ethnic and political identity, and generally arakan. It is self-governing under the Union of Burma under President U No, and some Muslims were even members of the Burmese parliament, and the Rohingya Muslim politician Sultan Mahmoud was chosen as minister of health during (1960-1962), but in exchange for these rights, the last batch of mujahideen handed itself over to the Burmese government during the July and November 1961, with this agreement, the political stability of Arakan (Leider, 2018) has returned; Islam, 2018.

But the conditions of the Rohingya did not last long, it changed in 1962, after the military coup carried out by General Ne Win (Ne Win) on March 2, 1962 (Leider, 2018), the reforms in the country were halted, the Rohingya became called 'foreigners', and the military regime systematically targeted them and promised the 'identity of the Rohingya' 'A political threat to the country, and imposed several policies for the death of the Rohingya, while launching military operations against other minorities such as Karen and Kachin (Islam, 2018), and two years after his coup, General Ni Win abolished the administration of the May border, and annexed it in the Area of Akiab (present-day Sitwi) (Leider, 2018).

Subsequently, the armed forces intensified their military presence in north-western Arakan, mocked the Rohingya for road construction, and began to settle Buddhists in the predominantly Rohingya towns of Buthidaung and Mingdaw, which increased tensions between Buddhists and Rohingya, clashes between the two sides, and the cessation of the army Besides the Buddhists, who killed The Rohingya, stole their property, raped their women and burned their mosques, until they were forced to migrate to Bangladesh during (April 1991-May 1992), in numbers of more than 250,000 people (Nemoto, N.D.).



Burmese Policy towards the Rohingya and Its Impact on the Problem of Asylum (1991-March 1992)

The Burmese army, with its new weapons and high number (200,000-300,000) attacks on ethnic minority strongholds, has launched attacks to control all Burmese areas, and succeeded in taking control of some Karin centers in the south and some Kachin bases in the north-east of the country, killing and torturing Rape against them (Guyon, 1992). As for Arakan State, preliminary reports in early 1991 revealed a large Burmese military build-up heading towards Arakan, specifically for the Rohingya (Maungdaw) and Buthidaung(Buthidaung) predominantly Rohingya Muslim regions, some of whom had to flee to Bangladesh before the rainy season in In May 1991, they numbered 10,000 people, and on the way to escape, Burmese forces arrested some of them, and others managed to survive, after going to work in some towns and villages inhabited by their relatives (HRWA, 1996). It seems that the Burmese government's policy was based on the principle of force, not dialogue, so it wanted to impose its control over these areas through the army, causing harm to the minority people, especially the Rohingya, who fled the country.

As an act of action on the Bay Thea military operation, The Rohingya Solidarity Organization began its military work, through its elements who have taken refuge in Bangladesh. Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front was less active than the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, but these attacks have had negative consequences for the Rohingya, and the government has used it as a pretext to militarize Arakan and impose strict control (IFHRL, 2000). It can be said that the activity of the two organizations was not at the required level, although their foundation was introduced, but their number reached (800) men in 1991, because they did not receive the necessary popular support, and the reason for this is because the people did not want to join its ranks, the Burmese government took the attacks of these organizations or Joining it, a pretext for oppressing and filtering the Rohingya, which kept them away from it. But the arrival of refugees in Bangladesh was an opportunity for these organizations to provide them with recruits. Members of the Arakan Front along Cox's Bazar Road, to gain supporters, and to this end, some of its leaders held meetings with some refugee leaders and the International Islamic Relief Committee, and because some of the refugees were promoting the idea of returning to Burma, it was found in The same year, three refugees were killed in Balukhali camp, which is why the Bangladesh Camp Authority prevented members of The Solidarity Organization and the Arakan Front from entering the camps freely and publicly, but continued to work clandestinely among the refugees (HRWA, 1996). It is obvious that this reaction comes from the revolutionary organizations, because they want to prove their existence to the government and the Rohingya, as the main defender of the rights of the Rohingya, and may have expected the government to work to liquidate its elements, but with regard to the order to prevent them from entering the camps, it gave indications and

indications that The two organizations are accused of killing the three refugees, because they are encouraged to return to Burma, which is losing them to get new elements.

At a time when the refugee problem has worsened, political and constitutional conditions have not been better than those, and in 1992 General Saw Maung announced the stalled sessions for the drafting of the desired Burmese constitution, the first sessions of which began on 27 October 1990, on the pretext of the lack of cooperation of political parties (In particular, the National League and its allies (with the Council of State in reaching a convincing draft of the constitution, and they pursued a policy of confrontation with it, and the inability to continue with them, decided to start again to draft a new constitution and manage the political transition process, in which the army will have an important role (Myoe, 2007) . It is clear from this that there is a government trend to remove civilian political parties from decision-making positions in the next government, and perhaps to form an alliance between the army and the Council of State.

In the midst of this political and constitutional stalemate, new waves of refugees poured into Bangladesh, which became unwelcome, for lack of funding, and in February 1992 appealed to the United Nations for its assistance, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called for an assessment. The situation and the cessation of their displacement (Regland, 1994) continues, due to the Military Operation Bay Thea in northern Arakan, which resulted in (200,000) refugees from its launch until 1992 (Storai, 2018). In doing so, the problem of Rohingya refugees became clear and known to the United Nations through Bangladesh.

At the 48th meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in March 1992, U Tin Kyaw Hlaing, the Burmese delegate to the United Nations, said in his statement on March 3, 1992, that The Bangladeshi delegation confirmed in its statement announced on the same day (March 3) that the number of refugees entering the country every day is between 5,000 and 7,000, and they are on the rise. It is likely that the number mentioned by the Bangladeshi delegation is the closest to health for two reasons, firstly because the refugee camps are in Bangladesh and not in Burma, they know the number, and secondly, because Burma knows the real number of refugees, but it does not want to mention it, so as not to give any importance to the problem, and then to ease the international pressure on her, as she caused it.

Bangladeshi Endeavors and the beginning of the UN role (March-May 1992)

The Government of Bangladesh has opened its Chinese counterpart, which has a close relationship with Burma, to mediate an end to the problem, but China has assured Bangladesh that 'the problem between them and cannot interfere with it'. After Bangladesh knocked on the doors of China, headed towards the United States of America, Bangladesh's Prime



Minister Begum Khaleda Zia visited the United States during the period (March 17-21), 1992, and met with U.S. President George Bush and then the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and promised a problem The Rohingya are one of the priorities of her visit, because the number of refugees has reached (200,000) refugees at the time (ICJ, 1992). This step was very important to internationalize the problem, and to place it among the concerns of the major countries, to take their role in addressing it both within the corridors of the United Nations and abroad.

Indeed, after repeated appeals from Bangladesh, the United Nations took its turn to address the problem, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued two press statements, the first of which was on March 6, 1992, calling on the Burmese State Council to take all necessary measures that would end the situation. The tragedy in Burma, which, if not addressed quickly, will threaten the stability of the region and increase the suffering of the people ' (ICJ, 1992), and then responded with a second statement taken on March 24 of the same month, in which he revealed his 'intention to send a special UN envoy to Burma and Bangladesh, to help them solve the problem', and indeed arrived in early April Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, to Burma and then Bangladesh, seeking an agreement to solve the problem of Rohingya refugees (Regland, 1994). Certainly by sending its ambassador to Burma and then Bangladesh, the United Nations has taken its real role in developing appropriate solutions to the problem.

On the sidelines of the signing of the agreement, the Government of Bangladesh has opened its Burmese counterpart regarding the non-repeated expulsion of the Rohingya from Burma, and the official registration of The Rohingya as Burmese citizens and the provision of government documents, but Burmese officials confirmed that the registration will be for those who have official documents proving They belong only to Burma (Regland, 1994). Most of these officials certainly know that most Rohingya do not have government documents proving their affiliation with Burma, because of the policy of successive governments towards them, which means that they will continue to be marginalized in Burma, and that a problem is resolved for their refuge.

They agreed that the implementation of the agreement and the start of the return of refugees would officially begin on 15 May of the same year, and although time frames were set for the implementation of the convention, the two sides did not specify a specific mechanism for the voluntary return of refugees, and no provision was put in place allowing unhcr to monitor their return process. The UNHCR spokesman criticized the convention's negotiators for not identifying these matters, to ensure the safe return of refugees, and criticized the time limit set for their return, because it is unreasonable to return (5,000) refugees per day with arrangements taken On the basis of this, UNHCR demanded its formal intervention in the repatriation process, but the Burmese government refused to do so, and as a result of these

intersections, the date set by the convention (May 15, 1992) for the return of refugees was cancelled, and talks continued on the intervention of unhcr in The process of their return (ICJ, 1992), announced the withdrawal of its support for the Voluntary Safety and Return Agreement, and confirmed that the return of the Rohingya to their homeland is only supervised by the United Nations, to preserve their safety and ensure the proper implementation of the Safety and Voluntary Return Agreement (Regland, 1994). It seems that the negotiators of the agreement from both sides of the United Nations and Burma did not have the skill to negotiate, the REPRESENTATIVES of the United Nations believed that the issue of the return of refugees would be under their supervision, and the Burmese had the same feeling, while Bangladesh had no problem, whether it was the supervision of the United Nations or Burma, Its goal was to remove the refugees in any way, and as a result of this negotiating imbalance, it postponed the repatriation of refugees.

Meetings of the drafting of the Constitution and the Safety Agreement between Suspension and Activation (May 1992 - April 1994)

Instead of worrying about refugees, the Council of State went into the process of drafting a new constitution, announcing on 28 May 1992 that it had formed the steering committee, which would oversee the coordination meeting, which would issue official invitations to the figures to attend the coordination meeting, and the Council of State revealed some Details of the coordination meeting, he confirmed that it will be held in the meeting room located in the government building, located on Ahlon Road (Ahlong) at 8 a.m. on June 23, 1992, and will be attended by (15) members of the National League for Democracy and (6) of the Shan National League for Democracy (Shan Nationalities League for Democracy), three from the National Unity Party and one deputy from each of the Union Paoh National Organization, The Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization and the Shan State Democratic Party The Shan State Kokang Democratic Party and lahu National Development Party were asked to send the nominations of their members by name and according to the numbers allocated to them, and to hand them over to the Steering Committee by June 12, 1992 for Attending the coordination meeting, it will be the duty of the Steering Committee to develop the coordination agenda, identify the issues to be discussed, determine its procedures and monitor the amounts needed for the meeting, and then submit a report within a month after the conclusion of the coordination meeting, this report includes a programme Preparatory for the national conference to be held (Han, 2000). After these directives, it is clear that the Council of State has set a long political path to form the desired government.

To complete the process of drafting the desired constitution, the coordination meeting was held on schedule (June 23, 1992), and the Steering Committee submitted its report in July, the most important of which was to work on the formation of a national committee ahead of the National Convention, and the National Committee was formed on 4 October. The first of the



same year, consisting of (18) members, ten of them military officers and eight civilians, and tasked the committee with several tasks, the most important of which, in order to convene a national conference should establish the principles on which the process of drafting the constitution should be established, and must be ensured that these principles are in line with six basic objectives, namely, the preservation of the Union. Burmese; consolidation of national solidarity; consolidation and sustaining sovereignty; formation and sustaining a genuine multi-party democratic system; strengthening the enduring principles of justice, freedom and equality in the State; and the participation of the army, primarily in the future of national policy making, some opponents have criticized the issue of military intervention His participation in the political process, however, has been established and not cancelled, despite criticism from opponents (Myoe, 2007). The military's control over the constitution-drafting process became apparent after the appointment of 10 officers, and the issue of the formation of the National Committee gave the opposition the impression that the road to forming a government was still long.

In order to resolve the refugee problem, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in September 1992 informed the U.S. State Department in a press release that 'her country wants the early and safe return of refugees, and her country cannot bear their burden for a long time' (Regland, 1994). 49) Refugees in secret to Arakan, the first batch of Rohingya refugees to arrive in Burma since the signing of the Safety Agreement in April of the same year, and because of Bangladesh's insistence on deporting them, clashes took place inside their camps. Two days later (September 27) 10 refugees were injured after clashing with other refugees in a violent clash inside Nayapara camp in a town \"The clash between the two groups was caused by a difference of vision, there is a group of families who wanted to return to Burma, while the other (mostly revolutionaries) refused,\" said the Bangladeshi Interior Minister. \"Many refugees say they will not return, until the UN is allowed to supervise their return and ensure their safety.\" (ICJ, 1992). Despite their continued refusal to return, unhr announced on December 23, 1992, that Bangladesh had secretly returned more than 4,000 refugees to Burma, abandoned its promises to uphold the Voluntary Safety and Return Agreement, and then suspended the issue of its care for refugees because the government Bangladeshhas refused to allow UNHCR staff to enter refugee camps for confidential interviews (Regland, 1994), as a result, UNHCR closed its offices in refugee camps altogether and filed un-complaints against Bangladesh (HRWA, 1996). It is clear that the Bangladeshi government wants to return the refugees in any way, and has pressured and forced some of them to return, while unhr wants their return process to be safe and voluntary, which justifies its recent position.

Under the political circumstances in Burma, the Council of State announced on 1 January 1993 the Amnesty Act, which affirmed that death sentences and prison sentences of more than 10 years, issued by Burmese military and civilian courts during the period (September

18, 1988-December 31, 1992). The death penalty will be commuted to life imprisonment, life imprisonment will be reduced to 10 years, and those sentenced to more than 10 years in prison will be reduced to 10 years (Han, 2000), and after this law, the National Convention held its inaugural meeting on January 9, 1993, in the presence of () 702 delegates from most political parties in the country, and the intervention of the Council of State in the selection of delegates was evident, the number of delegates assigned by the Council to the task of attending the National Convention was about (489) delegates, i.e. 70% of the total attendance, while the rest of the political parties and national elites numbered (213 delegates, including 49 delegates who represented political parties in general, 107 on behalf of the winning political parties only (elections may 27, 1990) and (57) delegates represented state employees (Myoe, 2007), and it is worth mentioning that the proportion of representatives of political parties (winning the elections).

Those who were not named by the Council of State have changed from what they were at the coordination meeting last April, in this meeting they accounted for 15.24% of the attendance, which drew criticism from many opponents (Han, 2000). With his new presidency, the Council of State wanted to send messages of reassurance to the Burmese people through the Amnesty Act, but it returned from another angle and undermined the democratic opposition (which represents most of the Burmese people) and turned it into a minority in the meetings of the National Convention, and on the basis of this equation, it was not possible The Burmese people are moving against the Council of State, because they have been favored by the amnesty law, and the criticism that emerged of the marginalization of the winning political parties may have been issued by some political officials and not by the vast majority of the Burmese people, as if the Council of State wanted the amnesty law to be A taste for the Burmese people not to object to the marginalization of opposition parties.

Following unhcr's recent position, on 20 January 1993 Bangladesh temporarily suspended the forced return of refugees to Burma and began negotiating with Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, for the return of UNHCR to oversee the return of refugees and their stability. In Arakan, bangladesh secretly repatriated about 17,000 refugees during September 1992-January 1993 to Arakan, and after nine days of negotiations, UNHCR reached a new agreement with the Government of Bangladesh on the supervision of the United Nations on voluntary return of refugees, and began Officially supervised on February 1, 1993, when Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Mohammad Mustafizur Rahman announced that obstacles and misunderstandings about refugee problems were over, and Bangladesh reaffirmed its commitment and dedication to the policy of voluntarily repatriating refugees, UNHCR, for its part, has pledged to cooperate fully in order to voluntarily return refugees to Burma, with the latter insisting that UNHCR or anyone else not be allowed to supervise the return of the Rohingya and follow up their settlement in Arakan, and in line with the policy of understanding with Bangladesh, has signed In May 1993, Sadako Ogata signed a formal

memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh, included in the Agreement on the Safe and Voluntary Return of the Rohingya, through which UNHCR arrived in refugee camps in Bangladesh and international assistance poured in. As a continuation of this policy, on 5 November 1993, the High Commission delegate also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Burmese government (Council of State) to ensure that the High Commission supervises the process of the Arrival of the Rohingya in Arakan, follow-up to the issue of their stability, issue identification cards to them, and ensure that they enjoy freedom of movement.

According to the latest agreement, most of the refugees refused to return home, fearing burmese government repression, which prompted UNHCR to wait for their return for four months, seeking 10 of its staff to work in Burma, to find out the conditions there before the refugees were returned, and four staff members settled in Rangoun. Six in Arakan, after being reassured by the situation in Arakan, with the constant Bangladeshi pressure to resolve the refugee issue, UNHCR began its repatriation plan, explaining that within one year the plan would be completed, and senior UNHCR officials, including Werner Blatter, visited Burma in January. In February 1994, they met with representatives of foreign embassies there, informed some NGOs in Bangladesh of the improvement of the situation in Arakan, and then Werner Blatter visited Bangladesh, and then the High Commission and the Bangladeshi authorities began holding media sessions to encourage refugees to return home, They assured them that the situation there had improved, and that the conditions were ripe for their return, and despite these assurances, a unhcr study revealed that (27%) of the refugees wanted to return home, and the slow rate of return angered the Government of Bangladesh, which was very keen to return as soon as possible; Their presence caused clear local unrest, on the eve of its national elections, and accused the High Commission of slowing down in the return of refugees, and then threatened to withdraw from the renewal of the memorandum of understanding, and to make matters worse is the exposure of Bangladesh to a major hurricane on (2-3) May 1994, which resulted in the death of (200) Bangladeshis, 10,000 refugees were left homeless (HRWA, 1996). It is clear that unhcr wants the return of refugees voluntarily and is working to encourage them to do so, while Bangladesh has been reluctant to do so and wants to get rid of them as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, UNHCR was unconvinced by the situation of refugees in Burma, but due to Bangladeshi pressure and the government's move not to renew the memorandum of understanding with UNHCR, the latter was forced to continue to repatriate the refugees, whose return process was going through several stages, beginning with their transfer. From the camps to the border crossings, where each family is handed a list of their members to the Burmese immigration department, the latter takes pictures, and then the UNHCR receives a sum of (20) kyats (equivalent to \$20 at that time) for each refugee as personal expenses, including transport fees to their areas, which take place in Mostly by ferries licensed by the

Immigration Department, and during the movement they were subject to extortion, because everyone had to pay the transport fare including children, of whom 200 are taken, while trucks take (1000) keats per family, and after arriving in their areas, UNHCR works in Arakan To deliver a food ration sufficient for (15) days for the family (IFHRL, 2000). It is clear that UNHCR was not convinced of the return of the refugees, because it did not secure the Burmese side, which may be entrusted with the refugees after their return, and had to not respond to Bangladeshi pressure at all costs, and that the refugees should not be involved in returning home under those circumstances.

Return of Refugees and Continued Suffering in Burma (April-December 1994)

In conjunction with the return of refugees, on April 28, 1994, nine bombs exploded on Burmese government buildings in the centre of Mongdaw district, without causing any injuries. Human Rights Watch interviewed a source close to The Islamic Relief organization in March 1996 (that elements of the Solidarity Organization were actually planning to plant a bomb in Mongdaw, and after the ongoing follow-up of the case, the Bangladeshi border forces provided their Burmese counterpart with information about the entry of those involved in the bombing once In light of this information, Burmese forces arrested and killed 30 people involved in the incident, and accused some Burmese officials of obstructing the work of the High Commission in Arakan and restricting their movement there, which prompted burmese forces to accompany UNHCR during the refugee supervision tours, however, their work was confined within the Regions of Mongdaw and Sittwe, and the refugees began to enter Arakan on 30 April 1994 after being suspended for two days due to the bombing, some organizations have stated that the number of refugees who returned after the activation of a memorandum The understanding was (50,000 refugees) HRWA, 1996 . The second phase of the repatriation process began in theory in November 1993, but actually began in April 1994.

The Burmese forces took advantage of the bombing incident on their behalf, and months later began investigations with the Rohingya, arresting all those suspected of sympathizing with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and raiding houses late at night under the pretext of interrogation, which led the Rohingya (including returnees) to disappear, The government intensified its military presence in Mongdaw after the arrival of additional military battalions, which set up new roadblocks, and Mongdaw Muslims reported that interrogations were going on for a week, and a Muslim woman complained about the injustice of Burmese forces, because she killed her 30-year-old son. One year, who returned to the country in 1993 after being a refugee in Bangladesh camps, was killed on suspicion of belonging to the Rohingya Solidarity Organization after a lengthy interrogation, and repeated cases when a person was shot by Burmese forces, who interrogated him and broke his legs and one arm on his way to the hospital, and when he told his family The UNHCR on the incident did nothing, and then a group of refugees presented a list of (15) people killed by Burmese forces to Human Rights

Watch, without the sporadic cases that unhr did not mention so as not to affect the functioning of its work and the return of refugees to their areas (HRWA, 1996). In doing so, the Mongdaw bombings gave the Burmese forces full legitimacy to kill the Rohingya, under the pretext of fighting the rebels and maintaining the security and stability of Arakan, although the perpetrators were members of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, who are considered to be involved in the killing of the Rohingya, because they were the reason for granting sufficient legitimacy. For Burmese forces to exterminate the Rohingya.

It is worth mentioning that with regard to the second survey, many refugees stated that they had registered on the pretext of a correction in their families' records, and did not know that the registration meant agreeing to return to Burma. I agreed with the Burmese government not to force them to force them to work and they will enjoy freedom of movement like other nationalities, unhr will pay for the reconstruction and restoration of their homes, and will provide food and other basic products for 10 years, and promise them the necessary protection if you persecute them Burmese government (IFHRL, 2000). Although some of unhr's commitments to refugees have not been proven, unhr can be said to have failed the refugees because it persuaded them to return and responded to Bangladeshi pressure.

The refugee problem worsened further after the Government of Bangladesh announced its desire not to renew the memorandum of understanding with UNHCR and to go home to return all refugees, at a time when UNHCR needed international assistance, as the repatriation process since its inception until August 1994 It has cost more than \$60 million, and UNHCR has already begun registering most of the refugees, and 176,297 refugees have agreed to return, and 8,903 refugees have been excluded for political and judicial reasons related to their entry into Burma, and 14,000 refugees entered Arakan in September 1994 . It is clear from the rapid registration of refugees that they were not in favour of their desire.

Under these circumstances, in October 1994, the European Union sent a mission to Arakan to look at the circumstances of the Rohingya, and one month later (November), the Mission confirmed the existence of sectarian violence in the Sittwe area of The Arakan Centre. Buddhist students on some Muslim shops and their homes in the main market of Sitwe, was caused by an altercation between a Muslim shopkeeper with a Buddhist monk, after which the attacks continued for three days, during which students attacked some Muslim mosques with stones, including the oldest and largest mosque in Sittwe, and because of which he was killed Two Muslims and a pregnant woman were seriously injured, and the Burmese authorities intervened only after a late time, arresting no Buddhist, but demanding muslims to move from Sittwe to another area (HRWA, 1996). This incident may have been one of dozens of undocumented or unmentioned events, sectarianism is rooted in the essence of many Burmese Buddhists towards the Rohingya, because Buddhist monks have been working on this side for many years, and they are praising the people sectarianly, it is difficult to

change them once the High Commission intervenes, and these Sectarianism is practiced by the average citizen and the security man, who has a duty to protect the lives of citizens, but because of the sectarian hatred against the Ruhaniya, he is stripped of his responsibility and professionalism and becomes a hateful person who wants revenge against his enemies.

In the same year (1994), the illiteracy rate (90%) compared to the general rate in the country, which was 29%, and the Rohingya revealed some of the reasons for this falling percentage, as existing schools impose high fees on their children, The cost of transportation is high, and each child had to pay (500) kyats for their textbooks, while the Rohingya teachers did not appoint them since 1978, and referred the remaining of them to retirement, and sometimes dismissed them on the pretext of not greeting the Burmese national flag or because of their free beards, and with this policy and the passage of Years, the absence of Muslim teachers in public schools, in addition to the miserable way in which Buddhist teachers teach Muslim children in Arakan, and for these reasons, led Muslim families to refrain from sending their children to teach in public schools, which provided a second job opportunity For many Buddhist teachers, who were paid 1000 kyats per month without time (IFHRL, 2000). Through this policy, the Burmese government will ensure the emergence of an uneducated Rohingya generation, which it can control more easily.

Conclusions

1. The Rohingya were victims of the ruling military regime, supported by Buddhist monks, who -were religiously shipping the people to instill religious hatred in their conscience, and because of their ill-treatment they had to seek refuge in Bangladesh.
2. The Rohingya have suffered from difficult humanitarian conditions in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
3. Bangladesh's position on the humanitarian-Islamic attitude that needs to be pursued towards refugees in general and not only the Rohingya, the refugee in general is looking for security and security because it is missing at home because of difficult circumstances, he should not deal with it as harshly and harshly as Bangladesh did with the Rohingya in The camps, which forced them to return to Burma under difficult humanitarian conditions, on the basis of that, Bangladesh bears a double responsibility as a state of asylum, and as an Islamic state that has embraced Muslim refugees and an Islamic state, it should have provided them with all the necessary assistance within a period of time. To take refuge, not to complain about their existence, and to push them towards the military regime in Burma to be victims of it.
4. The role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was not at its best, as it was hoped that it should have imposed its policy on the Burmese and Bangladeshi governments, not the other way around, but was accused of participating in

the persecution of the Rohingya, because it had promised them the necessary protection and then disavowed it. After they returned home to Burma.

5. The Burmese military regime practiced the most horrible methods against the Rohingya, and they were denied the right of citizenship, with which most of their rights fell in their homeland Burma, and they became treated as foreigners and not citizens, leaving them with no rights, and imposed arbitrary taxes on them.
6. The military regime in power of religion (Buddhism) relied to gain legitimacy from most Burmese Buddhist people, after it criminalized the Rohingya under the pretext of defending Buddhism from possible Islamic expansion, and used Buddhism as a means of covering up its crimes and to win the friendliness of most Burmese, and to terrorize its opponents. Politicians, especially the National League for Democracy.
7. The absence of effective Rohingya military organization, in the face of the extremist policy of the ruling military regime, there is no armed Rohingya revolutionary organization capable of defending the rights of the Rohingya, and if it does, its role is negative and counterproductive to them, because most of its attacks were sporadic and few, and were not widespread and capable. Some of these attacks were used as a pretext to persecute and kill the Rohingya, under the pretext of threatening the security and stability of the Arakan region.
8. The absence of a leading figure who can contain all the sons of the Rohingya, and move strongly to end their whole cause, the fragmentation was among them, which helped the ruling regime to control them easily.
9. The absence of the role of the Islamic world in supporting The Rohingya refugees, and intervening strongly to resolve their problem, but most Muslim countries have stood by them, and only some of the shy positions of Malaysia and Indonesia, which sometimes intervene without a clear and decisive impact on the refugee problem, are mentioned.



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