

Government Response and Communication in Covid-19 Crisis Management in Indonesia

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This study aims to explain the response and communication of the government in the Covid-19 crisis management in Indonesia. It was conducted based on the Qualitative Content Analysis (QualCA) approach to 11 Twitter accounts and the official website of government agencies and state ministries whose specific task was to accelerate the handling of Covid-19 in Indonesia. Nvivo 12 plus software is used to capture Twitter content, theme categorisation, topic mapping, and data analysis. This study revealed that the response and communication of the government in Covid-19 crisis management in Indonesia took place in the form of taking and implementing social distancing policies and Large Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB). However, the policy failed to reduce the Covid-19 curve in Indonesia, which is caused by poor communication of the crisis by the government which then has an impact on community non-compliance with the provisions of social distancing policies and PSBB policies. Future studies need to explain the effect of the government response and communication on the effectiveness of handling Covid-19 in Indonesia.

Key words: *Response, Communication, Covid-19, Crisis Management, Corona Virus, Government, Indonesia.*

Introduction

Indonesia, as a country ranked the 33rd highest in the whole world, seeks to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic seriously. The Indonesian government formally responded to the coronavirus outbreak on January 11, which at that time globally the WHO warned the world community about detection of the spread of coronaviruses between people, who at that time also asked governments around the world to be aware of the spread of the coronavirus (Setiati & Azwar, 2020). Jokowi insisted there was no lockdown option. The government chose a more flexible path by appealing to people to implement social distancing. Then, in May, President Jokowi has implemented a Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) policy. From the end of May to early June, the Indonesian government envisaged the adoption of a "New Normal" policy – a policy that gave people access to outside activities but still paid attention to health protocols (Abidah, Hidaayatullah, Simamora, Fehabutar, & Mutakinati, 2020).

Many observers and a number of previous studies revealed that the Indonesian government was judged to be slow in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic (Pennycook, McPhetres, Zhang, & Rand, 2020): communication and coordination between ministries and state institutions were considered inadequate, communication and coordination between the central and regional governments were considered as not going well, government officials such as President Jokowi and related ministries were seen as stuttering in making decisions and implementing policies in handling Covid-19 (Abidah et al., 2020). Crisis management and crisis communication of the Indonesian government are considered inadequate, the Indonesian government is considered to ignore the dangers of the coronavirus, implementation of Covid-19 handling policies are considered ineffective, government communication during the spread of the coronavirus is considered to confuse the public, and government cooperation with a number of stakeholders in dealing with Covid-19 is not going well (Setiati & Azwar, 2020). These problems confirm that the response and communication of the government in the Covid-19 crisis management in Indonesia are considered bad.

The previous research findings above are based on the analysis of social media content and literature review. This research intends to complement the research findings, which are based on the Twitter content analysis approach and the official website of government agencies and state ministries that specifically play a role in dealing with Covid-19 in Indonesia. This paper wants to explain and answer research questions, namely how the form of government response and communication during the Covid-19 played out in Indonesia? And how is the intensity of the government's response and communication during the Covid-19 crisis in Indonesia?

Literature Review

The function of social media used as a means of dealing with disasters, consists of the function of listening, a means of monitoring, social integration, networking collaboration, creating social cohesion, a means of raising funds, and researching media (Alexander, 2014). These seven functions of social media play an essential role in disaster management, both during and after a disaster. During a disaster, social media functions to listen and monitor problems that occur (Avery, 2017). At this stage, the government can understand information and data on disaster management quickly and accurately, which then accelerates the government to take action on disaster management (Singh et al., 2020).

A number of studies reveal that disaster management needs to start with efforts to obtain and present information and data directly related to the disaster that is happening, including information and data about the disaster including the area, population of residents living in the area, and geographical conditions of the region affected by disasters (Lachlan, Spence, Lin, Najarian, & Del Greco, 2016). Other information and data that need to be obtained and prepared are the number of victims, the cause of the disaster, the public response to the disaster, and the types of needs of victims and the public exposed to the disaster (Reddy et al., 2009). Lack of information and data results in the failure of the government in disaster management, which in turn also results in new problems, such as public protests, corruption, and poverty (Acar & Muraki, 2011).

Social media plays an important role in increasing the intensity of communication and coordination of stakeholders in disaster management. Central and local governments can use social media as a means of coordination and communication for the benefit of quicker disaster management (Taylor & Kent, 2010). The central government forms a task force that specifically uses social media as a means of coordination and communication with all government units, including the local government. The central government can control and direct all government units to make and implement disaster management decisions quickly and accurately (Thackeray, Neiger, Smith, & Van Wagenen, 2012). Conversely, all government units including local governments can provide information and responses to disaster management policies made by the central government, which can then be used as a reference for developing disaster management policies (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012).

Moreover, the community can use social media to convey their aspirations and demands for disaster management to the government. In this case, the community provides the government with information and data on problems that occur during a disaster, including information relating to the distribution of aid, public services, the identity of victims, and the problem of implementing disaster management policies in the field (Reddy et al., 2009). In addition, the community can also use social media to monitor the progress of the ongoing disaster and ask

about the condition of their affected families. The intensity of community interaction and communication through social media is very helpful for the government to understand the problems that occur during a disaster (Waters, Burnett, Lamm, & Lucas, 2009). On the contrary, the community through social media can easily communicate with the government and the wider community, which then helps to resolve the disaster problems that are being faced (Thackeray et al., 2012).

The intensity of communication and coordination of disaster management requires the awareness and willingness of all parties to jointly prepare information and data that supports disaster management quickly and accurately (Thackeray et al., 2012). Awareness and willingness to prepare minimal information affect the lack of communication and coordination of stakeholders, which in turn has a negative impact on disaster management, which in turn has a negative impact on decision making for disaster management; namely all parties, especially the central government and regional governments, making overlapping disaster management policies. Overlapping, even between policies that are contradictory; policies that do not support each other to deal with disasters quickly and appropriately (Panagiotopoulos, Barnett, Bigdeli, & Sams, 2016). As a consequence, the policies made were not effective in resolving the current disaster problems. On the contrary, the difference in policy between the central government and regional governments raises new problems in dealing with disasters, namely conflicts of interest between the centre and the regions (Getchell & Sellnow, 2016).

Increasing the intensity of communication and interaction of all parties in dealing with disasters needs to be supported by the situational awareness of each party; the central government, regional governments, and the community. Situational awareness is related to the understanding of all parties about what is happening in the environment around the disaster. Harrald, Jefferson, Fiedrich, Sener, & Mixed-Freeman (2007) explain the conditions for increasing the situational awareness of the parties, namely (1) the availability of information and data; (2) the information and data collected describes the actual disaster situation; (3) data describing the disaster situation occurring in the field; (4) data support the development of empowerment of victims or disaster-affected communities; and (5) data can be used as a reference for making decisions about disaster management appropriately. The situational awareness-raising requirements emphasise that the availability of information and data is the main key that must be prepared to support disaster management properly.

The development of digital technology and social media applications can be used to meet the situational awareness-raising requirements described above. Social media users have the ability to gather information and data, such as taking pictures, videos, and increasing the intensity of communication and conversation related to problems during a disaster (Zhang, Fan, Yao, Hu, & Mostafavi, 2019). Governments and communities can exchange information and data through dialogue, communication and opinion, which then produces big data that supports

disaster management quickly and accurately (Osterrieder, 2013). Government units, both at the central and regional levels, intend to develop intensive internal and external communication, such as conveying information on disaster management policies, appeals for the anticipation of aftershocks, victim assistance, and post-disaster management programs and activities (Van der Meer & Verhoeven, 2013). Communication built by all government units facilitates the formation of cooperation and collaboration, both internally and externally by the government that supports the acceleration of disaster management (Bernaoui et al., 2019).

Method

This study uses a Qualitative Content Analysis (QualCA) method, a method that emphasises the study and interpretation of texts such as interview texts, newspapers, policy documents, and observational notes (Elo et al., 2014). However, today, QualCA is not only used for these types of documents but is also used for text analysis sourced from social media – Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and online media (Parker, Saundage, & Lee, 2011). The use of QualCA in this research is to study and interpret the conversational texts (tweets) of government officials in the official Twitter social media of government institutions and ministries relating to the response and communication of the government in dealing with the Covid-19 crisis in Indonesia (Table 1).

Table 1: Twitter accounts and official websites of government agencies and state ministries as research data sources.

No	institution name	Official Account	Twitter	Official Website
1	President Jokowi	@jokowi		https://www.setneg.go.id/
2	National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB)	@BNPB_Indonesia		https://bnpb.go.id/
3	Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia	@KemenkesRI		https://www.kemkes.go.id/
4	The Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia	@kemendagri		https://www.kemendagri.go.id/

5	Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia	@kemenhub151	http://dephub.go.id/
6	Ministry of Education and Culture	@Kemdikbud_RI	https://www.kemdikbud.go.id/
7	Ministry of Social Affairs (Ministry of Social Affairs)	@KemensosRI	https://www.kemosos.go.id/
8	The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia	@perekonomianri	https://www.ekon.go.id/
9	Ministry of Communication and Information	@kemkominfo	https://kominfo.go.id/
10	Kabungan Secretariat	@setkabgoid	https://setkab.go.id/
11	The Indonesian COVID Handling Acceleration Task Force	#BersatuLawanCovid19	https://covid19.go.id/

This research was carried out through the following stages (Linda Lai & To, 2015): (1) determining the topic to be analysed on Twitter content, (2) choosing a Twitter account that is in line with the research problem and being able to answer research questions, (3) collecting official Twitter accounts of government agencies and ministries that are the objects of analysis; (4) capturing the content of the twitter accounts using qualitative data analysis software; (5) data/ text categorisation of each content witter; (6) coding of data that has been categorised so that it becomes a unified concept, which then becomes part of the findings of this study; (7) data analysis using qualitative research software features which then produce qualitative data in numerical and chart form; (8) data description and narration; (9) check and recheck data; and (10) discussion of research results.

This research uses NVivo 12 plus software, which is software that has the ability to capture text on social media content, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and online media (Edwards-Jones, 2014). In this study, NVivo 12 plus is used for capturing the contents of a Twitter account, coding text, compiling text categorisation, composing nodes and concepts, and

analysing data. NVivo 12 plus features are used for data analysis in this study, namely the auto code, crosstab, and chart data features. The auto code feature is used to group text into themes and arrange nodes and concepts that are directly related to the response and communication of the government in Covid-19 crisis management in Indonesia. The crosstab feature is used to analyse themes based on the respective Twitter accounts of government agencies and ministries that are used as the unit of analysis for this study and based on the time/month since Indonesia was announced to be exposed to Covid-19. Then, the chat feature is used to analyse the intensity of the response and government communication in Covid-19 crisis management in Indonesia.

Result and Discussion

Government Response and Communication in Handling Covid-19


The Indonesian government, in this case, President Jokowi, paid very serious attention to the Covid-19 pandemic problem. Since February until now, President Jokowi has mobilised his resources to support the handling of Covid-19, including moving government agencies and related ministries to communicate, coordinate and cooperate in handling Covid-19 (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012). At the beginning of March, President Jokowi formed the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling Covid-19, which consisted of ministries and government agencies involved in the disaster in health, economic, and defence and security matters. Then, President Jokowi made social distancing regulations which were implemented comprehensively at national and regional levels throughout Indonesia. President Jokowi asked all government agencies to oversee and support the implementation of social distancing policies consistently (Lovejoy, Waters, & Saxton, 2012).

President Jokowi's response is followed and supported by the participation of relevant ministries that sought to implement social distancing regulations in accordance with their respective fields and affairs (Reddy et al., 2009). Even so, the Covid-19 curve in Indonesia continues to climb upward, which shows that social distancing policy is not effective in suppressing the Covid-19 figure in Indonesia. President Jokowi's response was followed and supported by the participation of relevant ministries that sought to implement social distancing regulations in accordance with their respective fields and affairs (Reddy et al., 2009). Even so, the Covid-19 curve in Indonesia continues to climb upward.

Furthermore, President Jokowi made and implemented a Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) policy. The application and implementation of the PSBB policy in a region lies with the authority of the central government. One of the considerations of the central government in implementing the PSBB policy in an area is whether the region is an area where the rate of coronavirus spread is very fast, which contributes to the increase in the number of corona positive patients. The regional governments implementing the PSBB policy, namely Banten, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, South Kalimantan, North Kalimantan, West

Sumatra, Riau, South Sulawesi, are ten provinces that implement the PSBB policy. A number of these areas are in the coronavirus red zone region; the curve of the number of patients infected with coronavirus increases every day as in graph 1. Table 2 reveals that despite the adoption of the PSBB policy, the COVID-19 curve in a number of these regions did not necessarily go down; instead some regions showed an increase in the number of positive Covid-19 patients. President Jokowi continues to call on all government institutions, both at the central and regional levels, to remain focussed and consistent in supporting the acceleration of the handling of Covid-19 in all regions of Indonesia.

Graph 1. Positive case based on PSBB area



Source: <https://www.kemkes.go.id/>, 2020

The implementation of Covid-19 handling policies as explained above shows that the Indonesian government has been and is trying to move the country's resources to deal with the Covid-19 outbreak in all parts of Indonesia, which also shows the government's responsiveness to the Covid-19 crisis (Thackeray et al., 2012). The seriousness of the government in responding to the Covid-19 crisis is clearly illustrated in the communication content and conversations of government officials on the official twitter accounts of state institutions and ministries that are directly related to the affairs of handling Covid-19 (Maresh-Fuehrer & Smith, 2016). Based on a word cloud analysis of twelve Twitter accounts of government agencies and the Republic of Indonesia's state ministries, it was revealed that Indonesian government officials discussed the Covid-19 issue intensively and consistently, which is

program", "aid", "#kemensosohadir", and "sosial masyarakat". The consistency of conversation and communication of state officials in the official Twitter accounts of government institutions shows that the Indonesian government is responding to the Covid-19 crisis through implementing Covid-19 policies and implementing programs that support Covid-19 handling and support the stability of the country's economy.

Overall, the Indonesian government agency's Twitter account discusses Covid-19 including social assistance programs for people affected by the COVID plague (a program for society), Covid-19 issues, calls for staying together, government efforts, appeals to stay productive and calm, appeals to remain optimistic (stay optimistic), socialisation of government programs and policies (government appeals), and the impact of Covid-19 (COVID-19 impacts). Among the topics of discussion, social assistance programs are the topics most often discussed by government officials, which is inseparable from the high demands and aspirations of the public for the government to provide social assistance for those affected COVID 19. Also, the high intensity of discussions about social assistance programs is also caused by the many problems that occur during the process of distribution of social assistance. The government is trying to overcome these problems, one of which is through intensive communication and conversation on official Twitter social media across ministries and government officials.

Then, the government intensively discussed the COVID pandemic, handling policies, handling facilities and infrastructure. The intensity of the talk about COVID shows that the government is trying to focus on the source of the Covid-19 pandemic problem. The government is of the view that the Covid-19 outbreak cannot be completely and totally resolved, but the government is trying to control the spread of the Covid-19 outbreak through social distancing, appeals for healthy and clean living, PSBB policies, and New Normal policies. Therefore, the government also focussed the discussion on calls for the community to stay together and unite against the corona, convincing the public that the government's efforts in handling COVID were a form of concern and responsiveness of government officials towards the crisis. Besides that, the government also urges the community that even though the government implements social distancing and PSBB policies, the community remains productive in their respective work, which can be done from home. The community is also expected to remain calm in facing Covid-19 and remain optimistic that Indonesia can face the Covid-19 epidemic.


The government is also trying to appeal to the community to remain consistent in keeping their distance, avoiding crowds, while not holding congregational worship at places of worship such as mosques and churches, not organising social activities that invite crowds of residents, and not doing other activities that support the rapid spread of corona. The government is trying to get rid of the coronavirus immediately, to prevent spread in various regions and reduce the curve of patients infected with corona. The government said that if the Covid-19 outbreak was not immediately resolved, Covid-19 would have a broad impact on the country and people's

lives in all sectors, especially the economic sector. The impact of Covid-19 on the country's economy includes industries that cannot operate normally, like automotive manufacturing companies which are under great pressure because of their dependence on global supply chains that hinder the production process. The tourism and aviation sector are empty of passengers due to social distancing policies, and non-food retailers are empty of visitors. Also the garment industry which implements a system of reducing employee density by means of two work weeks and two weeks off to reduce the spread of the coronavirus, of course, has suffered the impact of decreased production so that companies can suffer losses that result in layoffs.

The Intensity of Response and Communication of Covid-19 Handling in Indonesia


The Indonesian government has responded to the Covid-19 problem, starting in February until now (graph 2). In February, the intensity of the government responding to the issue of COVID was no higher than the impact of COVID-19, which confirms that the Indonesian government was slow to respond to the problem of Covid-19 (Mirbabaie & Zapatka, 2017). The impact caused by Covid-19 has been widespread in all parts of Indonesia: one of the impacts was the uncontrolled public panic at that time which is reflected in the community's efforts to buy basic goods and medical devices in a number of markets. Even at that time, medical devices such as masks and hand sanitisers experienced scarcity, and because of that, the prices of masks and hand sanitisers surged up. While at the same time, the government said that the coronavirus would not be widespread in Indonesian territory. At that time, government officials, especially the Minister of Health and President Jokowi, always said that the government would easily control the coronavirus if the virus entered Indonesia. Therefore, the government urged people not to panic.

Graph 2. Government response to Covid-19 in Indonesia



Furthermore, in early March, the Indonesian government began to announce that Indonesia had been exposed to a coronavirus outbreak. At the beginning of March, the government began to pay serious attention to the Covid-19 issue, which was marked by the government's efforts to implement a social distancing policy, whereby in this case the government banned residents from crowding and urged people to stay at home, work from home, wear masks, wash hands with soap, maintain health, and exercise. Furthermore, the impact of COVID-19 has remained the concern of the government and the people of Indonesia. In April, the government increased the intensity of Covid-19 treatment because the coronavirus-positive patient curve continued to climb up, the death rate from Covid-19 also rose, while the cure rate did not go down. At the same time, the impact of Covid-19 is also increasingly widespread in various sectors, especially the economic, industrial, tourism, and small and medium businesses. Then, in May, the government continued to increase its seriousness in dealing with Covid-19, namely the government implemented the PSBB policy, which despite its implementation, the policy was not effective in reducing the positive curve of Covid-19 while the impact of Covid-19 continued to weaken the country's economy.


Graph 3. Stakeholder response to Covid-19 in Indonesia.



President Jokowi is an actor who played an active role in responding to the Covid-19 issue, both to the public panic and the impact of Covid-19—followed by BNPB, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, and Ministry of Education and Culture, which shows that President Jokowi pays serious attention to the impact of COVID -19 and its handling (graph 3). President Jokowi formed the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling Covid-19, which consists of BNPB and a number of related ministries. President Jokowi's seriousness affected the seriousness of government institutions in responding to the Covid-19 issue, in which BNPB,


which was shown as the coordinator of the Covid-19 Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling Coordination, had an active role in mobilising relevant ministries to create and implement a Covid-19 handling policy that could control the spread of the coronavirus throughout Indonesia. The active role of President Jokowi also shows that President Jokowi as head of state and head of government has an active role in responding to the Covid-19 crisis in Indonesia (Jong, Dückers, & van der Velden, 2016).

Graph 4. Government response to Covid-19 in Indonesia




In March, the Indonesian government began to show a serious response to the handling of Covid-19 (graph 4). The government appealed to the public to remain at home, comply with social distancing rules and regulations, and implement the PSBB policy provisions. In mid-March, the central government continued to coordinate and communicate with all parties, including with local governments and the wider community in various regions, aiming at the optimal execution of the Covid-19 policy. However, at the same time, the government received criticism from the wider community regarding the slow response of the government to COVID-19, poor government communication and coordination and inconsistencies in handling COVID-19 policies between one ministry and other ministries. Nevertheless, the central government remains consistent in making regulations and implementing COVID-19 handling policies, including providing social assistance to the community.

Graph 5. Stakeholder response to Covid-19 in Indonesia



Graph 5 reveals the most important actor in the implementation of Covid-19 handling program, policy implementation, and an appeal to the public to continue to pay attention to health protocols in every activity, namely President Jokowi, which was then followed by the active role of the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Culture, BPNPB, Ministry of Transportation, and Ministry of Home Affairs (Lovejoy et al., 2012). The active role of President Jokowi emphasised that the President was trying to mobilise state resources to oversee and ensure the implementation of policies and the implementation of the Covid-19 handling program completely. President Jokowi always appealed that all state institutions, local governments, the private sector, and the wider community must work together to succeed in implementing the policy of handling Covid-19, both social distancing policy and PSBB implementation.


Graph 6. Government response to Covid-19 in Indonesia



The government realises that social distancing policy and the application of PSBB requires cooperation between all parties, namely the central government, regional governments, the private sector, and the community. Therefore, the government continues to call on all parties

to work together and work together to support the implementation of co-19 handling policies. In various media, especially on social media Twitter, the government has consistently from February to the present appealed to unite against the coronavirus, adhere to health protocols, keep a distance, and for the public to familiarise with a clean and healthy life. From February to May, the government seemed to consistently emphasise that the community would be united, productive, calm and optimistic in facing the Covid-19 outbreak (Graph 6). The consistency of the government's appeals shows that the government used a persuasive approach rather than a repressive approach in regulating and directing the community to support the implementation and implementation of Covid-19 handling policies.

Graph 7. Stakeholder response to Covid-19 in Indonesia




Graph 7 above shows that the President is the most active actor in providing appeals and direction to both the government and the public to unite against corona and remain productive, calm, and optimistic in the face of the Covid-19 outbreak. The dominance of the role of President Jokowi shows that the response and communication handling of Covid-19 in Indonesia was initiated by the top leadership of the organisation, which also showed that the communication pattern of handling Covid-19 in Indonesia took place through a top-down communication approach.

Impact of Government Responses to Covid-19 Handling in Indonesia

The adoption of social distancing and PSBB policies did not have a significant impact on the decline in the COVID-19 curve in Indonesia (graph 8). Many parties consider that the failure of the two policies for handling Covid-19 in Indonesia is caused by two things, namely first, the poor communication of the government in dealing with Covid-19, which is reflected in the overlapping policies for handling Covid-19 between one ministry and other ministries. For example, the ministry of health issued a social distancing regulation, which regulates that no

mass crowd is allowed in a place, including public spaces and government offices. The Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling Covid-19 issued a policy supporting social distancing, and one of them is that the community is not allowed to go back and forth (returning home) using public transportation. However, at the same time, the transportation ministry issued a policy that public transportation was allowed to operate, which meant that the public could use public transportation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Secondly, the lack of public awareness to comply with government regulations is also one of the factors that led to the failure of social distancing policies, and PSBB has pushed the Covid-19 figure in Indonesia.

Graph 8. The corona virus-positive case curve in Indonesia



Source: <https://www.Ministry of Health.go.id/>, 2020.

The implementation of social distancing and PSBB policies, in addition to failing to reduce Covid-19 figures, also had a negative impact on the Indonesian economic sector. During the implementation of social distancing and PSBB, economic activity and community mobility were restricted, which in turn affected community income (<https://www.ekon.go.id/>, 2020). The government is trying to provide social assistance to the community in the form of the Family Hope Program (PKH), Food Packages, Pre-Work Cards, 450 VA Electricity Tariff Exemption, and other Social Assistance (<https://www.ekon.go.id/>, 2020). Nevertheless, these government policies cannot stabilise the economy of the Indonesian people. Therefore, the Indonesian government applies the New Normal policy, which is a new order that regulates interaction in people's lives, encouraging the citizens to pay attention and comply with health protocols established and implemented by the government. The new normal policy provides opportunities for people to work outside their homes, including working in offices, markets and other workplaces, which aims to stabilise the Indonesian economy. The government hopes that the new normal policy will be able to restore economic conditions and be able to control the spread of the coronavirus.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This research reveals that the Indonesian government seeks to respond to the Covid-19 crisis in the form of making and implementing Covid-19 handling policies, namely implementing social distancing policies, large-scale social restrictions (PSBB), and planning the implementation of the New Normal policies. Based on the content of the conversation on the social media Twitter, the Indonesian government, especially President Jokowi, seeks to establish communication with a number of government officials both in government agencies and in state ministries, which aims to formulate a policy for handling Covid-19, oversee the implementation of Covid-19 policies, and jointly urge the public to comply with health protocols established by the government through social distancing and PSBB policies.

During the implementation of social distancing and PSBB policies, the mobility of the Indonesian economy did not proceed normally due to the appeal of the government for the Indonesian people throughout the region to remain at home, keep their distance, and avoid crowds. The appeal has reduced the productivity of the Indonesian people and effected a lack of community economic income which has had the impact of reducing the purchasing power of the people. Nevertheless, this study also revealed that in the midst of the economic downturn caused by Covid-19, the Indonesian government consistently communicated through Twitter, in which it discussed the policy of handling Covid-19, the government's efforts, an appeal to the public to unite against Covid-19, obeying health protocols like keeping a distance and staying home, ensuring that Covid-19's handling policies run effectively, and urging the public to remain optimistic that Indonesia can control Covid-19.

Although this research is able to reveal the response and communication of the government in Covid-19 crisis management, this research has not been able to explain the effect of the government response and communications on the effectiveness of handling Covid-19 in Indonesia. Therefore, subsequent studies need to explain this effect.

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