

Anti-Corruption Practice in the Promotion and Transferring of Administrative Officials

Suwat Chansug^a, ^aFaculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol University, Thailand, Email: wat9999@windowslive.com

Corruption is a serious concern all over the world, including in Thailand. Corruption in the promotion and transfer of a position of the administrative officials is one kind of corruption. Factors and behaviours that influence corruption and anti-corruption seem unclear. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the behaviours that lead to corruption in the promotion and transferring process, the anti-corruption of transfer of a position in administrative officers and the relation between the learning process and the anti-corruption of transferring position in administrative officers. The results reveal that almost all participants (91.9%) experienced corruption in the promotion and transfer process even though most participants were not involved in this process directly. Of the participants, 35 percent informed that they used to offer support in the appointment and transfer from their companies to those who graduated from the same educational institutions. Five interviewees indicated they had a negative attitude about corruption in the promotion and transfer process. The relationship between persons, educational institutes and the relationship of politics are factors that may relate to corruption. The correlation of anti-corruption behaviour and the perception towards its effects in the promotion and transfer process of the administrative officers were on a medium level. Regarding the results, corruption may be difficult to resolve in a short time. However, at least the government officers are aware and intend to stop corruption. In addition, many organisations have focused on anti-corruption. Hence, the corruption in promotion and transfer of position may possibly be resolved.

Key words: *Anti-Corruption, Transferring.*

Introduction

Corruption in the government organisation is a serious issue all over the world and this problem should be resolved (Myint, 2000). In Thailand, corruption is also a major problem. Multiple levels of corruption can be measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2018). Thailand was rated 99th of the least corrupt nations out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2018). Several causes may lead to corruption in Thailand, such as personnel management and nomination (Sumalpong, 2016). The corruption in personnel management involves all stages of the management process in things such as settling someone in government services, appointing somebody for a higher position, providing rewards, and transferring the position of government officials (Sumalpong, 2016).

Recently, the Thai government clearly presented the policy of promoting the merit system in an appointment and transfer of a position of government officers. In addition, the government also planned effective measures to prevent interference from politicians, which is utilised in the personnel management with officers from different sectors (Policy statement of the Prime Minister Gen Prayut Chan-ocha, 2014). The parliament has established selected committees in order to investigate and troubleshoot bureaucratic patronage in Thailand.

Due to the problems of corruption in the promotion and transfer process, the researcher is interested in factors that influence anti-corruption behaviour and the problem-solving method in the promotion and transfer process. Therefore, the objectives of this study are: 1) to investigate behaviours that lead to corruption in the appointment and transferring process of Thai government officials; 2) to indicate the anti-corruption behaviour in the transferring position process of Thai government officials; and 3) to examine the relationship between learning processes and anti-corruption in the appointment processes of Thai government officials.

Literature Reviews

Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain (Transparency International, 2018). This is supported by Johnson (1996) who states that corruption is the actions that deviate from the standard behaviours that society set up, including regulations. Corruption in the appointment and transfer processes can be identified as a crime (Sutherland & Cressey, 1966). Clinard (1968) as cited in Pol.LT.COL. (Reangphoo, 2001, p.6) defines crime as an offense under criminal law. In the same vein, Piumsomboon (1988) defines crime as any action that is against the law and results in prosecution, including convicted offenders. The corruption in the appointment and transfer process could consist of two forms; direct corruption such as beneficial payoff by money, and indirect corruption such as using influence to distort the appointment and transferring process. There are several factors that

could be causes of corruption, such as a developing economy, social structure, cultural competition, opportunity structure, motivation, beliefs of capitalism, businessman concept, trading formality, law enforcement, purpose of life and business, effect of offense, punishment, social justification, worthiness and risk in an investment, and corrupted staff (Ades & Tella, 1996; Goel & Nelson, 2010; Supreeyasontorn, 2008; Treisman, 2000).

The appointment and transferring process for civil officials operate under the Civil Service Act, B.E 2551. The purpose of the process used is based on the principles of law that is integrity, by emphasising ability, equality, justification and transparency that could be verified. Everyone should receive opportunity equally. The Civil Service Commission is an organisation that takes responsibility for corruption and misconduct in the personnel administration and brings discretion in the appointment and transfer process to justification.

Theory and Concept

Differential Association Theory

Differential association theory presents how people's behaviour gets influenced by socio-cultural factors (Matsueda, 1988). Sutherland (1978) presents that behaviours of crime are not caused directly by heredity or the social environment; nevertheless, they came from the behaviour learning process of crime with close people by physical and verbal interaction.

Sutherland (1978) focuses on the importance of two elements of this learning theory. The first element is the content of what is learned, which includes the special techniques in committing the crime, finding suitable motivation, giving a rational explanation, having attitudes and convincing people to agree with the offense. The second element is processing, by which the learning takes place.

According to the theory mentioned above, the behaviour, including corrupt actions, is caused by persons associated with one another as friends and commanders that depends on the duration, the contact frequencies and the influence of the associated person. If there is much influence, it could affect learning behaviour, attitudes, values and various behaviour patterns, especially when considering the context of the organisation relations. A person who initially enters an organisation does not have the corrupt behaviour. However, after learning the culture of the organisation on a particular matter, the person begins to show similar corrupt behaviour by association. Hence, the person will finally commit corruption and misconduct.

The Concept of White- Collar Crime

Piumsomboon (1988) divided crimes into five categories such as crimes without victims, basic crimes of a criminal organisation, white-collar crime and special crime. Sutherland

(1978) defines white-collar crime as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his (or her) occupation. In the same vein, Piumsomboon (1988) defines white-collar crime as a crime in which the offenders are in position whether government offices, state enterprises or private corporations. Examples of these kinds of crimes would be: an accountant who embezzled some money in their responsibility; the commissions paid to bid for government construction; money receive immorally from the candidates for instatement and appointment in the service, or; the advantages taken in the corruption of civil servants and state enterprise employees, including the rewarding of mutual benefits between positions in the private and public sectors. According to the theory and concept above, the corruption in an appointment and transfer process could be classed as white-collar crime.

Research Methodology

Data collection was undertaken across Thailand using survey and interviews. Participants were four groups of administrative officers according to their positions, which are the position of governor, vice governor, deputy governor and the position of district-chief.

In the survey, simple random sampling was used as the selection method. A total of 297 administrative officers were invited to complete the questionnaire. This questionnaire comprised four sections. The first section held the general demographics samples, such as gender, age, duration of working for the government, level of education, position and main training courses. The second section asked participants about experiences of the appointment and transferring process, such as the duration of the recent position, the frequency of the appointment and of transferring their position. The questions were based on the behaviours in corruption issues.

For the interviews, a purposive sample of five administrator officers were invited to be interviewed for approximately 30 minutes. Their positions were not lower than the director of personnel division. They were asked about their perspective of the corruption behaviours and their opinion on anti-corruption.

Results

The General Information and the Background of the Appointment and Transfer Process

The total number of participants was 297, including: 218 district chief officers, 23 deputy governors, 36 vice governors and 20 governors. The average age was 54.13. The position of the deputy governor was transferred two times by average (half intentional and half unintentional). The vice governor position was transferred and appointed 1.13 times on average (intentional 2.01 times and unintentional 1.20 times). For governors, the appointment

and transferring happened 1.5 times on average, which was intentional 1.09 and unintentional 1.17 times.

In terms of the corruption of transferring the position, more than half of participants (63%) had tried to seek supporters at least one time while continuing procedures and the law process. Of the participants, 37 percent had never tried to find supporters in the transfer process.

The Issues Concerning Corruption of the Appointment and Transfer Process of Administrative Officers

The participants agreed that the corruption in the promotion and transfer process existed in their organisations/departments even though there was a competition by examining. For example, the participants mentioned that:

“...in general, the requirement of a person, who will be admitted to the high position, brings the high competition. A part of people will maintain the rules such as reading for tests and working hard for success”.

The categories of corruption could be divided into two groups, including the patronage system, and the authority of transferring and appointment. Also, the modification of government information practice in transfer and appointment consideration or examination that benefits someone. The interviewees described a person who has authority as:

“...the supporters are from various positions such as officers in personal administration, officers in the department, the companions of the officers of transfer, a director and a manager who is familiar with an administrator in the department”.

Alongside, new positions were booked for specific people by authority. The participants who provided information said that:

“...the assistance in transferring is common. If an officer can be supported (such as a director-general and a permanent secretary) they will be requested and informed. In the examination, there is high competition. The examiner is sometimes only the official seal but the winner has already [been] set earlier”.

The interviewees also mention the differences between the corruption in transfer and appointment, the patronage system and the support system. For instance,

“In terms of the administration, there is a different line between the supporting and the corruption in the appointment and the transfer. The support is the normal process, that could

be helped by an authorit[y] who has power in appointment and transfer. It is not coerced to make others be deprived of the right, while the corruption offers the asset. In the corruption, if the state agency denies the requirement, the suspected officers will be punished. The corruption is coercion to violate the law or to exceed the law process”.

The interviewees also mention the motivation of the corruption in transfer and appointment, such as;

“The main cause should be a patronage system in Thailand. This is because the Thai society has a patronage system for a long time”.

“A patronage system is [the] nature of Thai society, even in administration or other organisation[s].”

Regarding the information from the interviews about the graveness of the corruption in transferring and appointment in administration, the interviewees specify as follows:

“I divide it into two parts. If a prefect is promoted to a deputy governor or a deputy governor to a vice-governor or a vice governor to a governor, the competition is uplifting. The supporting process will be much more. Conversely, the transfer of position has a lower supporting process because the status will not be changed. The atmosphere of administration frequently affects the supporting system, for example, the supporting system will interfere with the transfer and the appointment when a politic is forceful. Sometimes, there is a command to a government agency”.

The Corruption in Appointment and Transfer of Government Officials in the Relation of Kindred

Most participants (86.3%) have known that the relative or spouse of seniors or the authority in appointment and transfer achieved their aims about transferred or appointed. However, a majority of participants (84.2%) have no direct experience of helping their relative in the process of being transferred and appointed.

Participants provided information during interviewing that many people who can reach their needs around being transferred and appointed are the relative of an administrator or person in a high position. In their opinion, the patronage system has existed for a long time in Thai culture and it has happened in the government organisation. For example,

“The descendants, relatives or spouses of politicians will get a special attention from the senior administrators because they benefit each other. Sometimes, senior administrators need to be supported by relatives of governor officers or the return of the last case”.

The Corruption in the Appointment and Transfer in the Government Officials through the Relation of Commanders

Almost all participants (92.6%) experienced government officers who have been appointed and transferred due to the support from senior government officers. In addition, 84.5 percent of the participants used to be assisted by their commanders. Only 15.5 percent had never obtained support from the commanders in the appointment and transferring of their positions.

In terms of the elements of the corruption behaviours, more than 50 percent used to have a personal relationship with their commanders. Most participants (75%) experienced the provision of incentives on some occasions, such as a new year festival. Of the participants, 65.7 percent mentioned that they have experiences to provide presents to the commanders when they were on the appointment and transferring process. In addition, approximately 50 percent used to conduct personal work for the commanders. Furthermore, there were 67.3 percent who had the idea that a personal relation to high-level commanders can make them succeed in their intention in the appointment and transferring of their positions.

The data collected from the interviews also mentions the issues of corruption in the promotion and transfer of a position through the relation with commanders such as:

“People will request support from the commander in each appointment and transfer. The commander will then present their information to the authority of appointment and transferring. Most commanders would assist their subordinate officers. For example, they may send the formal letter to the authority in appointment and transfer process to clarify the essential reasons for the required position. However, illegal payment has never been found through senior government officers.”

The data from the interviews indicates that the assistance or the patronage system in appointment and transfer between a superior and a subordinate were ordinary affairs. The government officers who have a requirement in the appointment and transferring positions had a superior who was familiar with the authority in appointment and transfer and in asking for support. The government officials would compensate for working or providing services to a superior personal affair.

The Behaviours in Corruption in the Appointment and Transfer of Administration Through the Educational Institution

Almost all participants (91.9%) had experienced knowing some officers, who were appointed and transferred, that graduated from the same educational institution with the person who had

the authority of appointment and transferring their positions. It is one of the major factors of the corruption in the promotion and transferring is the same educational institutions. Of the participants, 35 percent informed that they received support in the appointment and transferring of their positions from someone in a company who had graduated from the same educational institution. Interestingly, approximately 9 percent of participants indicated that they have been rejected from the appointment and transferring positions due to graduation from different educational institutions with the authority. These results were supported by the interviews. One officer explained that:

“At the moment, other educational institutions and other supporters take a role more than before. The role of a patronage in the educational institution [is] lower [than something like] a political relation and an identical commander”

The Corruption in the Appointment and Transfer through a Political Relation

Almost all participants (91.9%) have seen that government officers have been supported in their appointment and transfer by politicians. However, most participants (82%) indicate that they have never required any support from a politician in the appointment and transfer. To be more specific, the example information from interviewees concerning the corruption in the appointment and transfer through the political relation can be presented such as:

“In an examination, an appointment, a transfer or personal management, the document[s] of permission are always sent from politicians such as the team of Advisor of the Ministry, and the Secretary to the Minister or Chief of politicians in the ministry. The method is typing in a book then send[ing it] to the politicians by the government officers.”

The Anti-Corruption in the Promotion and Transferring the Position of Government Officials

The anti-corruption in the promotion and transferring process has been considered in terms of the expression in each aspect following:

(1) *The expression of preparation to resolve the corruption.*

The results indicate that 54.6 percent of participants had a high-level of preparation and 16.9 percent had very high level of preparation to solve the corruption in their organisation. The information from five interviewees about the intention to solve the corruption can be summarised as that they had a negative attitude toward corruption in the promotion and transfer of positions. They also suggested that there are differences between position support and corruption. If people received benefits for the promotion and transfer of a position without paying, this situation is not corruption. This is because the authority or supporter

helps transferors based on their feeling. On the contrary, corruption was a bribery or resulting adjustment in the examination that is illegal for the administration. Currently, the promotion and transferring policy focuses on anti-corruption and declares it as a national agenda. Thus, the administrators in the positions of a district officer, a deputy provincial governor, a vice governor, and a governor are the persons directly in charge of this policy.

(2) Denial of corruption in the appointment and transferring while having an opportunity.

The findings showed that 51 percent had a medium level of denial of corruption. The information from the interviews concerning the denial of corruption in the promotion and transfer of position shows, for example;

“As I heard that the behaviour of the government officers will find the support if their relatives are the senior government officers or the politicians in the examination or the appointment process. However, they might be unsuccessful to achieve their goal of transfer of position because there are other factors are considered. Not only from relation support.”

(3) Unacceptance of the officers from the patronage system.

Of the participants, 43.3 percent felt impassive about the corruption in the promotion and transferring process or about patronage system behaviours, while 23.6 percent of participants disagreed with the patronage system. The expression of unacceptance by the officers about the corruption in the promotion and transfer of positions shows the resistance from society. The expression from the interviewees indicates that the negative expression to the officers from patronage or support system does not exist or else is negligible because it is regarded as a personal subject, excepting only the unfair promotion and transfer of a position.

The Campaign of Anti-Corruption in the Promotion and Transferring Process

The findings from the survey show that a majority of participants (61.6%) had a preparation for the campaign of anti-corruption in the promotion and transferring process. There was interesting information from the interviews. Some interviewees mention that the promotion of the anti-corruption campaign in the promotion and transferring directly has not occurred. However, some projects were related to anti-corruption. Also, one interviewee expressed that:

“Only one in a hundred or one in a thousand who agrees to support the campaign of the anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer while the majority agrees with the support system without any expression”.

In the same vein, another interviewee explained that:

“In the past, the campaign of anti-corruption in the transfer and the election never occurred, except the cooperation in opposing the injustice, such as the admission to a Hadley school in 2552 B.E. due to the cooperation between government officers and the politicians. The campaign may occur in the case of the crisis in personnel management when the majority of the government officers does not accept”

Report to the Inspection Agency Concerning the Promotion and Transfer of Positions

To find a level awareness of the report to the inspection agency concerning the promotion and transfer of a position, 43.8 percent of the participants had an uncertain level and 39.7 percent agreed with this process. These results were extended by interviews. The personnel management or the ex-personnel management officers were coming from a director position in the expression of anti-corruption in the promotion and transferring process. For example, one interviewee explained that people will not report by themselves because there are many ways or organisations that help them to inspect concerns about corruption. The organisation, where working on anti-corruption, can help the inspection of the system since the government officer alone rarely does.

The Behaviours of Anti-Corruption in General

Approximately half (59.9%) of participants had an indifferent attitude to the anti-corruption behaviour in the appointment and transfer, while 28.3 percent of participants had low-level perspectives toward the anti-corruption behaviour.

The Relation between Learning and Anti-Corruption in the Promotion and Transfer of the Positions of the Government Officials

There was a relationship between the perception of the corruption in the promotion and transfer process and anti-corruption at a low level in the same direction. It can be predicted that the level of anti-corruption in the promotion and transfer process is 7 percent ($p < 0.001$). The perception of the effects of corruption in the promotion and transfer of positions shows a relationship between anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer at a medium level. It could be predicted that the level of anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer is 31 percent ($p < 0.001$). In terms of learning the techniques of corruption, there was a relationship between the learning of techniques of corruption in the promotion and transfer of positions, and anti-corruption, at a low level in the same direction. It can be predicted that the level of anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer is 7.4 percent ($p < 0.001$). Moreover, attitudes towards corruption in the promotion and transfer process have a relationship with anti-corruption at a medium level in the same direction. It can be predicted that the level of anti-

corruption in the appointment and transfer behaviour is 47.5 percent with 0.0001 statistically significant level.

Discussion

The results confirm that all administrative officers have been supported in the appointment and transfer for a current position at least once. The average in being positioned in each position was 1.97 years. This result is related to the policy of the Department of Provincial Administration's Regulations on Personnel Administration B.E. 2538 (1995). The next expected appointment and transfer after receiving the appointment, in general, is that the administrators would be appointed and transferred two times per year, for example the annual appointment and transfer would be held in October in order to restore and alter the pensionable age rate. Moreover, the mid-year transfer would be held in April. This policy indicates that the appointment and transfer process of the administrative officers first entered the government service as Deputy District Chief under the Department of Provincial Administration by instating the position according to the regulations in the knowledge worker positions.

According to the findings that most participants had experienced corruption in the appointment and transfer process, this may be because the patronage system was a deep-rooted problem in Thai society for a long time. It can seem in the Thai context that it is difficult to resolve the problem easily and successfully. In the same vein, Theravakin (2001) indicates that the original patronage system has an unchangeable influence.

Most administrative officers had readiness toward solving problems of corruption in the appointment and transfer process. However, there another issue was aroused, the definition of the corruption of the administrative officers. The administrative officers thought that the definition of corruption refers only to the failure to comply with the procedures for the appointment of the law or the adjustment of a document that was used to for consideration of the promotion and transfer process. However, it did not include the patronage system that caused bias discretion from the authorities in the appointment and transfer process. According to the issue mentioned, most of the administrative officers did not feel that they had committed corruption. According to an ABAC poll (2013), some Thai people overlooked the behaviour, which came from infection by minor corruption in childhood. Considering the role dimension of the administrative officers as the higher-level provincial executive for both district and sub-district, the readiness for compliance policy of the central government and the government must be complied. Hence, the readiness in solving problems of corruption or anti-corruption was related to the clarity of the policy and the intensity of involved policy level.

Most of the administrative officers who ignored the corruption when witnessing it in the appointment and transfer process had two kinds of features. First, the value of the administrative officers that did not complain about an issue that did not involve them. In the past, the officers would not complain about their commanders. However, there was an important change in 1997 to have more investigating mechanisms with government officers such as an administrative court, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman Thailand. Since then, complaints about an unfair appointment and transfer process has increased (Suksri, 2008).

The agreement and disagreement of corruption had a relation with anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer process in one direction at a high-level. Agreeing with corruption in the appointment and transfer process means acceptance of corruption in the appointment and transfer process. It is a concept from a valuable evaluation of the risk of punishment. Sutherland (1978) described the importance of the agreement or disagreement with the offence. It is a crucial principle for associating with different persons. That is, a person who became an offender because the idea of breaking the law was more than the idea of not breaking the law. Therefore, the disagreement with the corruption in the appointment and transfer process would have pushed government officers to experience anti-corruption at a higher level.

Conclusion

This research titled “The Anti-Corruption and Misconduct in the Appointment Process of the Administrative Government Officials” aims to investigate the behaviour of corruption and anti-corruption in the appointment process of administrative government officials, including the study of the correlation of the learning of corruption and anti-corruption in the appointment and the transfer process.

The data for the qualitative research was collected by interviewing the executives of the Department of Provincial Administration in the Ministry whose position was not lower than a Director of Personnel Division position. The five executives must currently work or must have once worked as officers of the Department of Provincial Administration or the officers of the Permanent Secretary. The interview was for collecting the in-depth information. The qualitative and quantitative data were utilised to analyse the corruption and anti-corruption in the appointment process of the administrative government officials, including finding the correlation between the learning of corruption, the variables and the perception of corruption in the appointment and transfer process. In addition, the two kinds of data were used to analyse the results of the perception of corruption in the appointment and transfer process, the learning technique of corruption in the appointment and transfer process, the attitude towards

corruption in the appointment and transfer process, and the opinions on the appointment and transfer process.

Most of the administrative officers had experienced corruption in the appointment and transfer process at least once. The corruption was based on several factors including the following: relationship commander, educational institutes and the relationship of politics. In addition, the behaviour of anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer process of most administrative officers was at an indifferent level. Any expression was not presented because it was considered a personal matter. Moreover, the expression of anti-corruption might create conflicts within institutions, except when the result of the consideration for the appointment and transfer process would be obviously against the law and cause the loss of their privilege. The correlation of the behaviour of anti-corruption and the perception towards its effects in the appointment and transfer process of the administrative officers was at a medium level. The correlation of the behaviour of anti-corruption and the attitudes towards corruption in the appointment and transfer process was in one direction. The correlation of the behaviour of anti-corruption and the agreement or disagreement with corruption in the appointment and transfer process of the administrative officers was at a high level. Hence, the corruption may be difficult to resolve in a short time. However, at least the government officers are aware and intend towards anti-corruption. In addition, many organisations are working on anti-corruption. Therefore, these issues can possibly be resolved.

Recommendations

The researcher would like to recommend for future research about preventing and solving the corruption problem in the appointment and transfer process, the following:

1. An understanding of solving the corruption problem in the appointment and transfer process must be made available to government officers, commanders and the general populace. The important issue is the distinguishability between caring societies and the patronage in the appointment and transfer process. The patronage system must not get involved with the appointment and transfer process completely, or even other processes. If the government officers and the commanders know and understand the matters mentioned, the corruption in the appointment and transfer process could be reduced at a particular level.
2. The discretion in the appointment and transfer process must be reduced to useless. The data collection of the element in the appointment and transfer process must be more scientific. Moreover, the consideration in the appointment and transfer process must be promoted to use the commission system in order to avoid one's discretion, which causes an opportunity for corruption and reduces the misuse of discretion.
3. The opportunity in expressing the disapproval or the anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer process should be created. This study shows that some government officers had

an intention to work against the corruption, the referring or the Merit system in the organisations. However, the shown expression of the administrative officers at this time was only criticism in a group of closed colleagues or closed commanders. This was an important stage for them to learn about the corruption and anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer process, which has an effect on behaviour. Furthermore, the expression that showed a solid result of anti-corruption in the next level was the complaint to the central personnel administration or investigating department. For example, the promotion of using the online campaign materials to run anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer process or the installation of associations, clubs or professional groups for campaigning to run anti-corruption in the appointment and transfer process.

4. The government should pay attention to corruption or the patronage system in the promotion and transfer process in the government organisations because it is the origin of other kinds of corruption. The government must prescribe specific organisations to respond to the mentioned duty in order to define policies, to specify working plans and to drive the suppression of corruption in the appointment and transfer process, seriously and concretely. Moreover, the punishment must be intense. However, the most important factors are the seriousness of the administration toward solving the problem and the process must not be corrupted or the patronage system must not be involved in the personnel administration.

5. The findings of the research presents that the corruption in the appointment and transfer process of the administrative officers consists of three elements: the government officers, the patrons and the authorised persons in the appointment and transfer process. However, this research focuses on the government officers who are the origin of the corruption, where the problems can be seen in one element. Hence, the study of the behaviour in the support of the corruption in the appointment and transfer process or the study of the behaviour of corruption in the appointment and transfer process of the authorised persons is needed in order to increase the knowledge of this topic completely.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the supervisory team who has been supportive since the beginning days of the Ph.D. course. They have been tremendous mentors for me. I would also like to thank all of my friends who supported me in writing and who encouraged me to strive towards my goal. I also acknowledge the valuable comments of the reviewers.



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