The Middle Eastern Countries and their Impact on the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis (Geo-Political Study)

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Turkey and Iran supported Qatar in a diplomatic confrontation that significantly contributed to the Gulf crisis, especially when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt took a stand towards the countries of the Middle East that supported Qatar in economic, military, and logistical fields. These conflicts have had a broad public impact in the international community. The political strategies of some countries were reflected in the conflicting parties during what was known as the Gulf crisis. This crisis has been studied according to International Data.

Key words: Crisis, Politics, Relations, Strategic.

Introduction

Qatar is considered as one of most important countries in the Middle East and one of the most important petroleum countries in the world. It also has a good relationship with the United States of America (USA) and its ally in the Middle East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). These relations played a role in several disputes in different fields, which lead Qatar and KSA to accuse each other of sponsoring terrorism. Saudi Arabia has used the relationship between Qatar and the Society of the Muslim Brothers (\textit{al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun}) as an excuse in order to accuse Qatar of incitement to acts of violence and terrorism in the world, while Qatar has strongly denied these accusations. This led to a rupture in the relations between these two countries, and broke off the economy of Qatar.
The Problem Statement

This study is an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What are the reasons behind Qatar Diplomatic Crisis?
2. What roles have the KAS, the UAE and Egypt assumed in the crisis?
3. What is the stance adopted by Turkey and Iran on the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis?

Hypothesis

1. The reasons for the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis includes economic factors such as the decline in oil prices or the pressures of the fierce wars in the neighbourhood. These factors prompted Saudi Arabia and Qatar to differ in views and to limit accusations between the two countries regarding the adoption and support of terrorism in the world.
2. KSA has an essential role in the Qatar diplomatic crisis. KSA has asked the countries in Middle East to remove Qatar economically and prevent travel to Qatar and withdraw all its citizens from Qatar. KSA also prevented Saudi companies from doing their business in Qatar. UAE and Egypt have taken the same attitude.
3. Turkey took Qatar Diplomatic Crisis as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Arab Gulf. It made airlift to support Qatar logistically, and also sent military forces to Qatar to show that it had a weight in the Middle East, while the Iranian attitude was confirmed by denouncing the economic isolation of Qatar. Iran was also ready to provide support to the Qatar.

The Objectives of the Study

The study aims at looking for the main causes of the Qatar diplomatic crisis and to investigate the attitudes of influential countries in the Middle East, especially those that have declared an economic breakthrough and countries that were on the side of Qatar and provided the necessary support.

Significance

The value of this study comes from the fact that the Qatar diplomatic crisis has taken a large area in the field of the interests of specialists in international and geo-political affairs (IA), because of the significant impacts the crisis has had on the Gulf region and the Middle East in general.
Methodology

The researcher used the analytical method (the realistic method). This method presents many international events and political experiences of countries dealing with each other. The main hypothesis of this method’s authors is the perpetual survival of international conflict, which takes many forms (political, military, economic, and civilizational… etc.).

Limitations

A. **Place Limits:** The study is mainly concerned with the situation in Qatar, astronomically located between two latitudes (24-26.5) north and between longitude (50-55) east. Map (1).

However, due to the intertwining of international relations and events and their complexity, the study will address two dimensions, which are the allies of the United States in the Arab Gulf, which are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the traditional regional powers in the Middle East (Turkey and Iran) (Arafat, 2016).

Map 1.

Reference: This map prepared the researcher, depend on: Sadiq Saleh, General Atlas, Al-Rusafi Press, Baghdad, 69.

B. **Time Limits:** The time limits of the present study are limited on the period from the beginning of Qatar diplomatic crisis and the beginning of the economic boycott of Qatar on 5/6/2017 to the year 2019.
The Reasons behind Qatar Diplomatic Crisis

Since 1995, the Qatari foreign strategy has been characterized by flexibility and the ability to manoeuvre and try to find balanced relations with most of the regional and international powers. Qatar has worked to establish the Al-Jazeera channel, and this channel has worked to host intellectual, media, and activists from various political, intellectual, liberal, national, leftist and Islamic currents, and Qatar has stood firm against aggression. The Israeli forces on Lebanon and Gaza, and with the start of the Arab Spring revolutions, the Arab countries tried to hold the Qatari media responsible for evading the process of holding people accountable for the mistakes and policies that led to the outbreak of the revolutionary situation in the Arab world (The Crisis, 2017).

The relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has always been complicated, but we can say that the relations between Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring areas was dominated by the crisis, increasing hostility and constant fighting in various forms. Any optimistic picture of Qatari-Saudi relations departs from these relations and from the chronic historical conflict. It can be said that Saudi Arabia, for its own reasons, is the result of its political class and the mentality of its rulers to dominate the entire Arabian Peninsula, including the Arab coast in The Gulf and Yemen, who do not feel safe with the presence of neighbouring countries, despite their small size and population. The situation in the Gulf Region is complex. Major events include the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in 2003, the beginning of the Arab Spring at the end of 2010, the rise of the Brotherhood in 2012 and their fall in 2013, the rise of Erdogan and his Ottoman orientations in Turkey, the Syrian civil war, and the Russian presence in Syria in 2015, the Western-Iranian nuclear agreement, the rise of ISIS in 2014, and the Saudi military intervention in Yemen in 2015, the fall in world oil prices, and the escalation of competition and proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Abdullah, 2017). The gulf situation in the area has become a site known as the Prisoners of Geography (Muhammad, 2017). By virtue of the land and other natural and human determinants, not to mention the economic interface represented by its natural resources and investments, Qatar has strengthened its position regionally and globally, which made the United States declare that the best parts of the world at the present time in terms of global investment is the State of Qatar (Nawaf, 2017). All of this has put Saudi Arabia in a worrying and uncomfortable situation that puts it in danger of any vibration, even if it is small. In other words, the strategy of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states are economic security strategies, including its foreign policy, and is seeking to preserve the systems of government in which Abdullah Abdul Amir is president.

The reasons behind the crisis can be summarized as the following:

1. Since the 1992 incident at al-Khafos outpost, in which Qatar felt that the GULF Cooperation Council (GCC) did not assume its full responsibilities during the border crisis
between it and Saudi Arabia, and officials increasingly believe that the goal of the Gulf is to marginalize the Qatari role. Qatar has taken the initiative to withdraw its forces operating within the framework of the Al Jazeera Shield, and began to adopt some independent positions with the aim of linking with external parties to balance the Saudi weight. Five cooperation agreements with Iran were concluded, in addition to an agreement with the United States in 2002 allowing the establishment of the largest U.S. military base in the region (base many) which was not Welcomed by Saudi Arabia.

2. The weak mechanisms for coordinating positions and the lack of joint diplomacy among the GCC countries as required have contributed to a gap between the collective policies adopted by the Council and those pursued by member states fortified by the principle of sovereignty.

3. The GCC is characterized by a clear heterogeneity in the elements of the relative strength of member states. The Council, which has created a competition for regional influence among its states, sometimes exceeds its strengths.

4. The crisis of confidence and reaching a dead end: Despite the 2014 Riyadh agreement between King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, emir of Qatar, which included a consensus on six issues, the four countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt) announced that it was wasted by Qatar. The four countries reinforced their list of accusations against Qatar with the documents and facts of specific individuals and entities. The Riyadh agreement is sufficient to prove Qatar's good intentions from these accusations, but officials in The State of Qatar responded that its requests fall under the "policy of imposition" and "infringement of the sovereignty of the state", from which the four countries began to boycott diplomacy as well as boycott drop by air and land (Mustafa).

2013 was a pivotal point in Qatar's foreign strategy, as the revolutionary tide began to recede as a result of the mistakes and failures of the revolutionary forces, the violence of the regimes, particularly the Syrian regime, the mistakes of Islamists in governing Egypt, the military's ambition to return to power, and the complexities of the political and social situations. The forces of the old regime and the counter-revolution began to gather their forces in preparation for a major counterattack, and achieved two important breakthroughs: the first in Egypt, where the army, with the active support of gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, was able to overthrow the democratic process, and put an end to the secretions of the Revolution of January 25 and its results. The second is in Syria, where, with Iranian support, the Assad regime has been able to withstand the forces of revolution and opposition and move on to a counter-offensive. This phase was known as the counterrevolutions led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which held Qatar responsible for trying to thwart its efforts to turn back the clock and to eliminate all the consequences of the Arab Spring revolutions. After the military coup in Egypt, the dispute erupted openly between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain on the one hand, and Qatar on the other, and ended with the withdrawal of their ambassadors from Qatar in early
2014. The crisis lasted about nine months and their condition was that Qatar does not support the military coup and at that time the whole world saw it as a transfer of a military father, and support for the coup was in the position of the minority internationally and even in Africa, so that the crisis would stop by withdrawing ambassadors (Gulf Relations, 2017).

Thus, it became clear that the current crisis was triggered by several differences in the ideas and orientations of Qatar on the one hand and the GCC countries and Egypt on the other, who often operated independently and often concluded agreements to find the equation of balance of power compared to the Saudi and Omani forces within the GCC. In addition to the lack of coordination and unity of views within the Cooperation Council, which has generated a state of discord and division between countries, the most important reasons that ignited the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is the issue of recriminations, which ended with the break-up and economic isolation of Qatar from the Cooperation.

**The Attitude of KSA, UAE and Egypt towards Qatar**

The embargo countries tried with their media agencies and foreign relations offices scattered in most countries of the world, as well as their foreign embassies with the financial materials possessed they possessed, to invade the State of Qatar and overthrow its political system. This attempt, however, failed. Likewise, these countries tried to tamper with the Qatari currency using high financial agencies and organizations from Monaco, Luxembourg, New York and London. Again, they failed, and instead focused their efforts on discrediting the State of Qatar by linking it to terrorism at home and abroad through its institutions and by financing terrorist operations. Qatari diplomacy, however, responded to those efforts and failed them. Qatar has nothing to do with terrorism, its institutions, or its financing, and is, on the contrary, an active partner in the fight against terrorism. By drying up its resources, for example, Qatar has won the signing of agreements in this regard with permanent members of the Security Council and with other countries (Mohammed, 2018).

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain announced on Monday, May 5, 2017, the severing of diplomatic relations with Qatar, and the imposition of the blockade that would close all air, sea and land ports. The systematic and widespread campaign against the State of Qatar included the dissemination of misinformation and fabricated news, the hacking of the Website of the Qatar News Agency "Qena", for example, and the imposition of an illegal and unjustified blockade against the State of Qatar. Citizens of the blockade countries were forced to leave Qatar, which led to violations of human rights, families have been separated and the right to education was violated and companies were closed. The United Nations on the penetration of an Emirati warplane into Qatari airspace, stressing the commitment of the Qatari Air Force to the highest standards of air safety and its consistent position to ensure the safety
of civilians, documented four violations of the airspace between December 2017 and February 2018 (Government Liaison Office).

**Turkish-Iranian Attitude towards Qatar Diplomatic Crisis**

It seems that through a simplified extrapolation of all Turkish attitudes, statements and actions since the first day of the crisis, it can be noted that the Turkish approach to it is based on four main factors:

a. The need to pursue a political and diplomatic solution and to avoid escalation, which is the core of the Turkish discourse, but the step of the parliament's vote on the deployment of military forces on Qatari territory was aimed in our opinion to send a message of deterrence and to prevent any catastrophic scenarios.
b. Positive neutrality in the sense of standing by Qatar, but without antagonizing the other side, especially Saudi Arabia.
c. Emphasizing and supporting Kuwaiti mediation and not offering Ankara itself as an alternative, but as an auxiliary and complementary party.
d. The blockade on Qatar is not allowed to be tightened politically and economically, hence the air bridge that Ankara has established to deliver food (Saeed, 2017).

**Turkey's Appointment with the Crisis Can be Derived Through two Axes: The Political and Military Initiatives of the Turkish Government are as follows:**

1. **The political axis:** the messages closer to siding with Doha in its crisis that it will not be alone and will not be left to isolation and singling out, a message that is in line with the statements of the Turkish president that preceded it hours earlier, when he spoke – in a different language from the game managed behind the crisis in the Gulf and about Turkey's intention to continue to develop its relations with Qatar.
2. **The Military Axis:** the deployment of Turkish troops on Qatari territory, which is determined to be a more clear and effective signal than language, conveys the Turkish position as consistent with the growing Turkish coarse power and its fusion with the soft power used exclusively in previous years of by Ankara (Saeed, 2017).

It makes sense for Ankara to see itself as targeted as Doha, then, or with it or perhaps before it (in the failed coup attempt), and this narrative has some reasons, contexts, motives and manifestations that should be delimited. The most important of these are:

1. Turkey and Qatar have the same views on most of the region's issues and files, which means that the grounds for the first indictment are the same as those of the second if there is political will to do so.
2. A number of people on the three Gulf terror lists are either residents or frequent Turkey, which opens the door to pressure on Turkey once the decision is made.

3. If the parties to the current crisis come to a solution that requires some personalities to leave Doha, as is the 2014 agreement, at least part of them will go to Turkey as one of the rare countries available to them, which would mean that they could fall under the charge of providing shelter and support to terrorists registered on official lists of those according to the narrative that you do when I want you to do.

4. In the event that Qatar surrenders to the triple axis, which is backed by Egypt and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Turkey will remain alone, and thus will become much weaker than before.

5. The narrative of targeting Turkey and Qatar together has been accepted by some Turkish politicians and journalists, the words of Qatar and Listen Turkey, in a simulation of the Arab/Turkish ideal sought by a Turkish opposition leader.

6. Michael Rubin, a former congressional official and researcher who wrote about Turkey's coup months earlier and is known for his writings Turkey and Erdogan, wrote in a four-word tweet, "Today Qatar, tomorrow Turkey", while Egypt publicly called for Ankara's blockade with Doha for the same reasons.

7. Accusing Turkey of supporting terrorism is not unusual, as American politicians and media have already published a picture of Erdogan and Davutoglu leaving a mosque claiming to have met with ISIS.

8. Turkish-U.S. relations have been strained over U.S. support for anti-Turkish Kurdish factions and the failure to hand over Fethullah Gülen to Turkey.

9. A number of members of Congress submitted a draft resolution imposing sanctions on supporters of Palestinian terrorism as it called the targeting of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and their supporters, particularly Qatar, Iran (text) and Turkey (implicitly), which, if passed and adopted, would be a very large element of pressure on the Palestinian resistance as well as on the countries that retain a good relationship with them both.

10. It seems that the Turkish moves that Ankara has been keen to confirm that it is not targeting or preparing anyone has upset some Gulf parties, which opened a door for the Kurds of Syria and the joke in Ankara, to host the Saudi media, primarily the leaders of the Democratic Union Party in Syria recently to direct Turkey's "Kurdish genocide" in an apparent but implicit media escalation against Ankara (Saeed, 2017).

As soon as the Turkish parliament ratified the bilateral defence law with Qatar on June 7, 2017, until Ankara followed with a high-level military mission to start preparations for the deployment of troops, the most important two factors in the construction of the Turkish advanced base in the Gulf were the road map and the timing of the deployment. The ultimate goal is likely to be the stationing of a joint force at the level of a brigade. Sources pointed out that the first batch of planned deployments could reach 1,000 troops, indicating the possibility of an adjustment in the process of supplying troops due to the urgent situation in Qatar. Moreover, Turkish media reported that the exercises started on 19 June 2017, and that these
measures showed that Ankara is about to complete the establishment of an independent joint mission between the Turkish gendarmerie and the Qatari internal security forces (Saeed, 2017).

Iran: As soon as the four countries of the embargo (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt) demanded Qatar officially announce the reduction of diplomatic representation with Iran and the closure of the missions, and the departure of the elements associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on Qatari territory, Iran itself spoke about its preparation for the crisis. Saudi Arabia is a privilege and at the same time prevents any change in the political geography of the region. Iran has focused on Saudi Arabia for two reasons: firstly, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, which exists in more than one regional file, and secondly Iran's understanding that Riyadh is leading the other three countries besieging Qatar. Although Iran’s few statements with the events of Sundays indicate that Iran’s calculations, especially in this crisis, are linked to the possibility of Tehran's gains, or reducing losses caused by this crisis, these gains are divided by what Iran sees as an alliance. In the field of economics, it is known that Iran and Qatar are prominent producers of gas and in the face of the positive development in Qatari-Russian relations and Iran-Russia relations, the possibility of adopting a unified policy related to the gas market will benefit Iran, Qatar, and Russia as well, and at the level of food, Iran announced its readiness in the first days of the crisis to supply Qatar with agricultural products and food through three ports, and in the same context Iran opened its airspace intensively for the passage of Qatari aviation (Mahjoub, 2017).

The Future of Gulf Investments in Turkey during Qatar Diplomatic Crisis

The volume of trade between Saudi Arabia and Turkey has increased several times in the last 10 years, from 1.5 billion dollars in 2006 to $5 billion in 2014, ultimately reaching about $6 billion (Gandhi, 2016).

The volume of investments during 2017 in Turkey reached 6 billion dollars, and the number of Saudi companies in Turkey during the same year reached 940 companies. The bilateral trade between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is the highest compared to the rest of the Islamic countries, and reached 5.65 million. In 2016, Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia reached $3.2 billion against $2.5 billion from the Kingdom (Tareq, 2019). While these investments decreased significantly during the crisis, through Table 1, it is noted that gulf direct investments in Turkey have declined during the last five years, at the level of annual flow, from a level of 940 million dollars in 2012 to 446 million dollars. There is no doubt that the tension of political relations between Turkey and the Gulf states has affected the decline of investments, and in light of the position of the two parties on the Arab spring revolutions, especially the situation of the military coup in Egypt. Although the Gulf states are focused on managing their foreign investments away from the Middle East region to Europe, America and Asia, the value of Gulf investments in Turkey decreased. In relation to total foreign direct investment flows in Turkey,
the average annual contribution of Gulf investments in total foreign investment flows in Turkey during the period was 4.4%. It is also notable that the relative importance of the contribution of Gulf investments in Turkey has declined over the past five years (Abdul, 2017).

Table 1: Gulf investments in Turkey during 2012-2016 in usd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gulf investment flow in Turkey</th>
<th>As a percentage of Turkey's total investment flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3090</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From the previous table, we see a decline in the volume of Gulf investments in Turkey, especially after it recorded an influx of 940 million dollars and a total flow of 6.9 in 2012. That percentage was declining with gulf investment flows in Turkey reaching $880 million and a total flow of 6.8 in 2013, while the lowest flow of Gulf investments in Turkey in 2014 was $364 million with a total flow of 2.8 million. In 2015, the flow of Gulf investments in Turkey was $460 million and the total flow was 2.6 million, while the volume of Gulf investments in Turkey reached 2.6 million. In 2016 about $446 million and a total flow ratio of only 3.6, reflected the magnitude of the decline in investments, particularly the gulf crisis.

Initiatives to Resolve the Crisis

Although the Emir of Qatar received an invitation from King Salman to attend the last Gulf summit on September 9, 2018, he did not attend, and only sent the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, "Sultan al-Marsi", to request the lifting of the blockade and "boycott." The GLOQ, in the same context and in the same month Qatar, announced its withdrawal from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as of January 2019 (Tareq, 2019). This means that the Gulf crisis is heading for an escalation, which requires the intervention of a neutral country with political weight in the region.

Both Kuwait and Oman are not parties to the dispute, and are declared members of the GCC system, and can therefore initiate mediation efforts between Qatar and the rest of the parties that have severed ties with Doha. Indeed, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber
al-Sabah, began a tour to Riyadh from the second day of the crisis in the Gulf, during which he met King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, followed by a brief visit to Dubai, where he met Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President of the UAE. The ruler of Dubai, as well as Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, finally arrived in Doha and met with the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, before returning again to Kuwait. This did not nominate any concrete results for the Kuwaiti move, but the peoples of the region still pin their hopes on that mediation (Jamal, 2017).

The possibility of prolonging the crisis is the most likely, given the failure of all regional and international mediation efforts, and Qatar's rejection of the conditions of the embargo countries "boycott", because it realizes that ceding one of the conditions may push it for further concessions, and see these conditions as factors violating its sovereignty and its role. In addition to compensating Qatar with the economic dimension through Turkish, Iranian and Omani support, the countries of the blockade are aware that resolving the crisis without Qatar implementing any of these conditions would be a political loss to them beyond any loss resulting from the continuation of the crisis, as well as the bet of the blockade countries. "On the factor of time and economic attrition as a factor that may push Qatar to bow (Tarek, 2017).

Scenarios of Qatar Diplomatic Crisis

There are three expected and possible scenarios of Qatar diplomatic crisis:

1. Conflict escalation: perhaps the most fortunate according to the current data, the countries of the blockade have provided intractable conditions deliberately because they want to put Qatar between the two options of full surrender and responsibility and the consequences of escalation. Since the 13 conditions strip Doha of its sovereign rights and foreign policy instruments and actually stamp it on the charge of supporting terrorism, it cannot respond positively to most of the conditions presented to it, allowing the countries of the embargo to escalate the situation and assume their responsibility at the same time. Qatar's failure to respond to such demands and the escalation that comes from the countries of the blockade is not predictable. Perhaps it is an escalation in the level of measures such as the provisions of the economic blockade and the removal of Qatar from the Cooperation Council and others, or through military action on to the borders or at home in Qatar, or by activating the option of coup again, or by internationalizing the crisis by filing a complaint against Qatar to the Security Council on the pretext of supporting terrorism (Saeed, 2017).

2. The continuation of the crisis: talks about the continuation of the crisis will last for a long time, encouraging positions in place, waiting for a tourist opportunity or any regional-international variables that may outweigh one option over another. The main reason for this are the options mentioned in the first scenario, which seem to be weighted in principle by the countries of the blockade. Without them, many obstacles and difficulties (for example
expelling Qatar from the GCC) have disastrous consequences (coup or military intervention), and are unlikely to gain explicit international approval.

3. The political solution is a solution based on concessions from both sides because, the geopolitical realities and the nature of the Gulf region politically and socially. The political, economic, and military potential of the countries indicate that Qatar's ability to withstand a complete and long-term break is not very high, which is likely to have a solution likeable to that of the 2014 crisis, i.e. making some concessions and bending over to pass the storm (Saeed, 2017).

4. Through the continuing differences in the views of the parties to the crisis, it is expected that the economic break will continue, and the attempts of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the disconnection countries continue to push Qatar towards exiting the Cooperation Council in order to weaken Qatar economically, and direct it towards bowing to the will of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as Saudi Arabia and the U.S.A recommends and demands.

Conclusions

1. The current crisis is not a political one, but has historical roots in Saudi Arabia's relations with its neighbouring countries, which are hostile and cautious.

2. The contribution of the Khfoss Police Station incident to Qatar's adoption of independent stances and goals and the conclusion of treaties with the United States, which raised the ire of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and that Qatar's taking these measures is due to lack of confidence in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

3. Differences of visions, coordination, and strength differentiation also contributed to deepening the gap between the GCC countries.

4. Exchanging accusations in terrorism support and financing issues is the most important reason for the occurrence of the Gulf crisis between Qatar and the GCC countries.

5. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the rest of the blockading countries adopt a policy of boycotting with Qatar, in order to weaken Qatar economically and push its exit from the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

6. Through the continuing difference in the views of the parties to the crisis, it is expected that the economic boycott will persist, and attempts will continue from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the boycott countries to push Qatar towards leaving the Cooperation Council with the aim of weakening Qatar economically, in order to direct it towards bowing to the will of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and American recommendations and demands.

7. Turkey stands with Qatar during the crisis, because it shares with Qatar the same goals and policies in the region. Turkey, too, is home to many figures accused of terrorism and its financing.

8. Iranian interference in the crisis is the result of Iran's desire to obtain gains. One of these gains is a division in what Iran sees as an “Arab alliance” against it. In the field of economy, it is known that Iran and Qatar are prominent gas producers and the positive development
in the Qatari-Russian relations suggest the possibility of adopting a unified policy related to the gas market that will benefit Iran, Qatar and Russia.

9. The direct Gulf investments in Turkey have declined during the past five years, at the level of annual flow, after having been in the range of 940 million dollars in 2012, they fell by nearly half in 2016 to reach 446 million dollars. Undoubtedly, the strained political relations between Turkey and the Gulf countries affected those investments.

10. The possibility of prolonging the crisis is the most likely possibility, in light of the failure of all regional and international mediation efforts, and Qatar's rejection of the terms of the "boycotting" blockade states, because it realizes that waiving one of the conditions may push them towards further concessions.

Suggestions

1. A Gulf country adopts the initiative to solve the crisis by bringing the views of Qatar and the blockade countries closer.
2. Re-trade between Qatar and the blockading countries, as this has negative economic impacts on the GCC states as a whole.
3. Re-work diplomatic companies, institutions and teams in embassies and consulates in order to encourage humanitarian assistance over political differences.
4. Reconsider the Gulf relations with Turkey and Iran to preserve its political, commercial and economic interests for the purpose of imposing security in the Arab Gulf regions.
5. Going around one table and resolving all the differences without the intervention of any regional party.
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