



Philosophical Controversies between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd

Athal Ibrahim Hussein^a, ^aDepartment of History, College of Education for Humanities, Kirkuk University, Kirkuk, Iraq, Email: Adhal.ibr@uokirkuk.edu.iq

Abi Hamid Al-Ghazali (450-505 Ah/ 1058-1111 AD) was a Muslim philosopher with prominent intellectuality, experience, efforts, and biography. In fact, he was a philosopher, narrator, jurist and Sufi. This has made him a cultural icon, representing an important phase of Arab-Islamic cultural history in the past and at present. Scholars with various interests' study and investigate the philosophy of Al-Ghazali. His intellectual identity remains the most important reason for disagreement between researchers when evaluating his works and perspectives. This disagreement indicates Imam Al-Ghazali's suffering and patience in disputes and controversies, as well as the richness of his thoughts. Imam Ibn Rushd is not less important than Imam Al-Ghazali. He was keen to seek knowledge and learning, particularly in the fields of language and medicine. He was truly a unique philosopher at the time. He left a huge number of books, representing an explicit proof of his knowledge and hard efforts. In fact, this topic requires a detailed study because it raises many questions that cannot be discussed in one paper. Hence, this paper focuses on investigating the debates and claims made by Imam Al-Ghazali against the philosophers. This can be achieved by presenting evidence argued by Ibn Rushd after nearly seventy years whereby he criticised Al-Ghazali's claims and defended philosophers and philosophy. He responded to Al-Ghazali's claims and accusations of atheism with a philosophical and rational dialogue. Ibn Rushd claimed that Al-Ghazali did not understand interpretations of philosophy properly as he was not familiar with the philosophers' intentions; therefore, he cannot accuse them of atheism.

Key words: *Philosophy, controversies, Imam Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd*

Introduction

Abi Hamed Al-Ghazali (450-505 A.H. / 1058-1111 A.D.) was a prominent Muslim philosopher; in addition to being a narrator, jurist and Sufi. This has made him a cultural icon, representing an important phase of Arab-Islamic cultural history in the past and at present (Ameen, 1963; Badawi, 1977; At-Tibawi, 1979). On the other hand, Imam Ibn Rushd (520-590 A.H. / 1126-1198 A.D.) was not less important than Imam Ghazali as he excelled in seeking knowledge and learning. He was prominent in linguistics, literature, medicine, and jurisprudence. Most of his interests were in philosophy. Indeed, he was a prominent philosopher during his time. He left a great number of books, proving his brilliance and hard efforts in science and knowledge (Fawzi, 1998).

Ibn Rushd is the author of "Tahafut Al-Tahafut" (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). He wrote it in response to Al-Ghazali's book "Tahafut Al-Falasifa" (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), intending to defend philosophy and philosophers. Accordingly, people condemned Ibn Rushd, thinking that he was attacking "*Hujjat Al-Islām*" (Proof of Islam) Imam Al-Ghazali (Al-Jisr, n.d.).

In fact, this topic requires a detailed study because it raises many questions that cannot be discussed in one paper. Hence, this paper focuses on investigating the debates and claims made by Imam Al-Ghazali against the philosophers. This can be achieved by presenting evidence argued by Ibn Rushd after nearly seventy years whereby he criticized Al-Ghazali's claims and defended philosophers and philosophy. He responded to Al-Ghazali's claims and accusations of atheism with a philosophical and rational dialogue. Ibn Rushd claimed that Al-Ghazali did not understand interpretations of philosophy properly as he was not familiar with the philosophers' intentions; therefore, he cannot accuse them of atheism (Ibn Rushd, 1986). This paper is organised in four sections as follows:

- A- Al-Ghazali is a philosopher.
- B- Ibn Rushd's opposition to Al-Ghazali.
- C- Confrontation.
- D- Ibn Rushd in the peak of confrontation.

Al-Ghazali is a philosopher

It is known that Arabs were not familiar with the real concept of philosophy (Al-Alawi, 2002) and were closer to wisdom than to philosophy (Ameen, 1969). Therefore, the Arabic version of Greek philosophy has considerably affected Islamic thinking. This encouraged scholars who sought knowledge to study philosophy until the emergence of theology, which could not establish a real philosophy. Consequently, people's interest in philosophy and its sciences (mathematical and logical) has increased (Al-Jabri, 1993), with the emergence of the great



philosophical works. Therefore, European philosophers have relied on works of Avicenna in medicine, Al-Razi in research, and Al-Ghazali in theology (Ameen, 1969).

Al-Ghazali intended to study philosophy; thus he collected philosophical works to deeply understand them. He studied philosophy and its sciences when he was working as a teacher in Baghdad. He understood the concept of philosophy within less than two years. He was keen to investigate it and reveal its falseness (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Ad-Dhahabi, 1994). He was sure that scholars would reveal the falseness of this science, when they understand it accurately and deeply (Al-Ghazali, 1961).

Moreover, refuting the concept of philosophy before investigating and understanding it would be in vain. Therefore, he wrote his book "Makasid Al-Falasifa" (the Aims of the Philosophers) in which he explained philosophers' opinions, doubts, and questions in detail as if he was one of them. He did that based on facts that revealed all hidden beliefs of his opponents. He aimed at proving his comprehensive knowledge and deep understanding of philosophers' false interpretations. Then, he wrote (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) to refute any concept violating logic and religion, especially those related to divine philosophers (Al-Jisr, n.d., 84-85). After studying philosophy and its sciences, he opposed other philosophers' trends at that time, due to their violation of Islamic doctrine. He found that those philosophers, who called for the preservation of logic unity in their inferences, did not satisfy the condition of logic unity when dealing with divine sciences (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

As a result, Al-Ghazali developed a pure Islamic philosophy without imitating the philosophers who preceded him. He was not an opponent of philosophy as a science, but he opposed the philosophy of disbelief. He adopted the righteous philosophical sciences that satisfy the rational conditions (such as logic and mathematics) and rejected religious issues. Hence, Al-Ghazali said: "I believed that among other matters, philosophers were characterised with disbelief and atheism as they were far from faith which they sought..." (Al-Ghazali, 1961, 20-21).

It is a fact that Al-Ghazali sometimes employed an influential style and then an ambiguous style at other times. So, some readers, when reading his book (the Aims of the Philosophers), believe that he is a philosopher, but a passive person when reading (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Sometimes, he adopts a skilful argument to show the reader that his opposition is not against philosophy and its sciences, but against some philosophers and their disbelief in particular. Imam Al-Ghazali has clarified this, saying that: "I found a satisfactory description when revealing the incoherence of the philosophers and their opposing views. Therefore, I believed that demonstrating their incoherence is achieved by presenting a brief discussion on their purposes..." (Al-Ghazali, 1960, 4). Perhaps the reason for his opposition is that a group of young people believed in the philosophers' impeccability at the time and ascertained the validity of their opinions and theories. This is because they were amazed by the logical and computational sciences, so they thought that this is also applied to religion (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

Al-Ghazali made objectivity, rationality, and instinct as the cognitive conditions of truth within the framework of the acquired knowledge, which is based on thoughtfulness, scrutiny, proof, and reliability of the content (Al-Jabri, 1993; Khalil, 2001). Al-Ghazali was aware of the meaning of his writings, such as the incoherence of the philosophers, the scandals of esotericism, the revival of the religious knowledge, the saviour from astray, and the aims of the philosophers. This is because he was certain that these books would not have the same impact if they were written by others. Moreover, he was aware of the extent of the power of knowledge and his authority, leadership, proof and existence (Al-Ghazali, 1960). He did not intend to persuade certain groups, as Ibn Rushd understood (Ibn Rushd, 1986).

Consequently, Al-Ghazali debated with philosophers using a critical philosophical dialogue. His debate was based on refutation as he revealed the falseness of philosophers' views and proofs. His purpose was to refute the disbelieving views of philosophers. In fact, this was achieved, and those philosophers disappeared in the east, until the appearance of Ibn Rushd. Due to the efforts of Imam Al-Ghazali in defending the Islamic religion, he was given the title "*Hujjat Al-Islām*" (Proof of Islam). He deserved this title because of defending the religious traditions and their suitability for the life of the individual and the security of society (Assaf, 2001).

Ibn Rushd's Opposition to Al-Ghazali

As stated earlier, Al-Ghazali's refutation was based on an in-depth study. His book (The incoherence of the Philosophers) received considerable attention. It had a wide impact on the Islamic intellectual environment at the time. It was considered the greatest attack made by theology on the philosophical rational intellect in the history of Islamic civilization. Accordingly, his opponents rebelled, and people resented all philosophers at that time (Qameer, 1986). This led Ibn Rushd to respond to that attack by writing his book (The incoherence of the incoherence) after nearly seventy-three years. Ibn Rushd did not hide his intention from the very beginning of his book as he mentioned under the title (the purpose of the book). He wrote: "The purpose of this book is to show the levels of validation and persuasion of claims found in Al-Ghazali's book (the incoherence of the philosophers) that most of which lack certainty and proof" (Ibn Rushd, 1986).

It is clear that Ibn Rushd attempted to undermine Al-Ghazali using all ways and methods that can underestimate him. This is to pave the way for the incitation of public opinion against his opponent, Al-Ghazali. Thus, he intended to refute and challenge Al-Ghazali's honesty when he refuted his claim in his book "The incoherence of the Philosophers". Al-Ghazali's claim was that he engaged in philosophy for mystifying its evidences and demonstrating philosophers' incoherence, not to defend a certain doctrine. Ibn Rushd began to refute this claim by arguing that: "...claiming that this book is not intended to support a particular doctrine was lest readers think that Al-Ghazali intended to support the doctrine of Ash'ari" (Ibn Rushd, 1986).



Although Ibn Rushd supported the philosophers of his time and some of his predecessors, he had criticised some of them, such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Alexander, and Themastius using a severe tone. He noticed well the mistakes committed by them, that he believed they did not benefit scientists whether in relation to understanding or interpretation. However, he mentioned their virtues for him and for others (Qameer, 1986). Ibn Rushd's position is not new as he criticised the jurists of his time explicitly and objectively in a satirical manner, clarifying his desire to underestimate their knowledge and then accuse them of heresy (Ibn Rushd, 1994).

Ibn Rushd appreciated Al-Ghazali on certain issues and did not hesitate to support him against his opponent Avicenna. He agreed with Al-Ghazali in criticising Avicenna on the issue of Al-Mighty Allah's knowledge on particulars (Ibn Rushd, 1986; Ash-Shammarid, 2002). However, he could not disregard Al-Ghazali's lack of scientific virtue in most of his writings, i.e., Al-Ghazali did not adhere to a certain doctrine in his books that he was Ash'ari with Ash'ari, Sufi with Sufism, and philosopher with philosophers. In his book "The incoherence of the incoherence", Ibn-Rushd followed the same way he used in his lengthy commentaries on the books of Aristotle. He read through the book and expressed his opinion. Ibn Rushd sometimes intervened on all or most of Al-Ghazali's phrases, to correct or respond to them (Ibn Rushd, 1986).

Confrontation

This study focuses more on the controversies between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd through presenting the three issues emphasised by Imam Al-Ghazali, when accusing the philosophers of atheism. Al-Ghazali explained that this accusation in relation to these issues is inevitable based on evidences. These issues are as follows:

1. The world is old.
2. Al-Mighty Allah does not know about particulars caused by people, but only knows totals (Exalted be Allah).
3. Denial of the resurrection of bodies and that the punishment in the hell, falls on spirits not bodies.

Al-Ghazali responded to the philosophers using these issues to confirm their disbelief and atheism. He deliberately falsified their words and underestimated them, believing that these three issues do not fit Islam. Therefore, these issues are discussed in details in the following subsections:

1. The world is old

Al-Ghazali mentions four important evidences on this issue (Al-Ghazali, 1966), as follows:

❖ The impossibility of creating a new creature by the old

The philosophers said it is impossible to create a new creature by the old because if it is thought that the old (i.e. Al-Mighty Allah) exists and the world, for example, is not created This would be because there is no resource that anticipates its existence, which is purely possible. So, if the world is created after that, there will be questions like: Who has created it? Why is it created now and not before? Is it due to the incapability of the old (Exalted be Allah above their claims) to create it? Or is it due to a renewed purpose? Or because there was a lost god? Or because He did not want to create it and then the will for its creation occurred?...etc. Thus, it is impossible to create a new creature by the old without changing it, and the status of the old cannot be assessed. As a result, it is inevitable that the world is old (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Al-Jisr, n.d.).

In response to this evidence, Al-Ghazali presented two objections:

- The creation of the world with an old will and the oldness of world are rejected because its oldness leads to endless life cycles (Al-Jisr, n.d.).
- The creation of a new creature by the old, must be permissible, because there are undeniable new things occurring in the world. If these new things were based on endless new things, there would be no need for their creator, which is impossible. For this reason, it is a must that the new creatures should be based on the old. It is noteworthy that Al-Ghazali has refused the creation of a new creature by the old, by the constant renewed periodic movement (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

❖ Time

Al-Ghazali opined that the philosophers believe that Al-Mighty Allah precedes the world due to two things: the entity or the time. Philosophers claimed that the intention behind saying that Al-Mighty Allah precedes the world is attributed to an entity not time, such as one precedes two (which is a fact). However, the entity and time may exist together, such as the cause comes before the effect. For example, the person moves before his shadow; they are equal in time where some are the cause, and some are the effect. It is said: the shadow movement is attributed to the movement of the person, but not the person's movement is attributed to the shadow movement. Thus, the precedence of Al-Mighty Allah over the world is attributed to time. Al-Mighty Allah and the world are either new or old. It is impossible that one of them is old and the other is new. Therefore, it is intended that Al-Mighty Allah precedes the world and time (i.e., not by entity but time). As a result, it is impossible to say the time is new. If it is a must to say time is old, the movement and the moving object should be old whereby time continues due to the continuation of object movement (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

Al-Ghazali objected to this evidence by saying: estimating the time before the world is an act of illusion because time is created (Al-Jisr, n.d.).

❖ The possibility of existence

Philosophers believe that before its existence, the world is possible. This possibility has no beginning. In order not to describe the existence of the world as impossible, the possibility of its existence is very old. Also, the existence of anything related to it is very old. This means that it is not impossible. If it is true that it is impossible, its existence before that would be impossible and that Al-Mighty Allah would have been unable to create it.

Al-Ghazali objected to this evidence by saying: the world is possible in the sense that its possibility is very old. Its creation is expected at any time, and the assumption of an endless existence is impossible (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

❖ The evidence of the possibility

Philosophers said: the object precedes any new thing added to it that the renew does not dispense with the object. Thus, the object is not new, but the new is its images, indications, and qualities, making it possible. This means that before its occurrence, the existence of any new thing is possible, impossible, or inevitable because the impossibility in itself never exists. If the possibility of its existence, which is an additional description that cannot stand alone, is real, there should be a new thing added to it, and this can be applied only to the object. For example, this object can move (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Al-Jisr, n.d.).

Al-Ghazali objected to this evidence by saying: the possibility is attributed to the judgment of logic, thus it is a logical issue and judgment. The possibility denotes that if the logic estimates the existence of an object, it will not be impossible. For example, the possibility of blackness is estimated by logic before its existence. If blackness occurs in a body, it is said: this body is possible to turn black before the existence of blackness in it. Here, the possibility is related to the body, but what is the rule of the same blackness in itself? Is it possible? It must be said that it is possible (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

2. Al-Mighty Allah lacks knowledge of partials

Some philosophers believe that Al-Mighty Allah knows only Himself, as Al-Mighty Allah says: "Verily, Allah is the All-Knower of the Unseen of the heavens and the earth. Verily! He is the All-Knower of that is in the breasts" (Al-Hilali & Khan, Chapter thirty-five, 38). While others, such as Avicenna, opine that He knows others. Avicenna argues that Al-Mighty Allah has a comprehensive knowledge of things regardless of their time. This knowledge remains the same in the past, present and future. However, he claimed that He knows not only an atom's weight in the heavens and earth, but also partials in a complete form (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Al-Jisr, n.d.). Change in the state of knowledge requires the change of its author. The eclipse of the sun, for example, before its occurrence, is non-existent; but when it occurs, it is described as existent and after its occurrence is known to be non-existent at the present time. Since change

is inapplicable to Al-Mighty Allah, philosophers opined that His state remains the same in these three conditions (i.e., before, during, and after). He knows the eclipse and all its qualities and indications since the creation of the world; therefore, He knows everything. His knowledge of these conditions (i.e., before the eclipse, during its occurrence, and after its end) remains the same and does not require a change in Himself. All occurrences are known by Al-Mighty Allah constantly, and this knowledge is not affected by time. As for the things that are divided by object and place, such as the characters of people and animals, He knows them completely. Consider the character of (Zaid), for example, he does not know his signs because they are related to sensors. So, if Zaid obeys or disobeys Al-Mighty Allah, then Al-Mighty Allah does not know Zaid's new conditions. Philosophers claimed that the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) was challenged using prophecy. Hence, Al-Mighty Allah does not know that he did so because He only knows that there are people challenging by using prophecy, but He (Exalted be Allah over their claims) does not know the prophet as a person. This is a rule believed by philosophers from which they derived the universal laws (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Ash-Shammari, 2002).

Al-Ghazali objected to this through two views. Firstly, if their purpose is to refute the change in Al-Mighty Allah, which is agreed upon, so why not that Al-Mighty Allah knows the eclipse with its three conditions, with eternal knowledge that does not change? And that these differences happen as pure addition? It is not necessary that there is a change in the knowledge of the existent and its end. If Allah allowed us to know the arrival of Zaid tomorrow when the sun rises, we would know his arrival at sunrise as we previously know that. If it is permissible that the knowledge of total species, races and indications does not require change, it will be permissible that the knowledge of the conditions of one thing divided by time, shall not require change (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

Secondly, if philosophers believe that the creation of a new creature by the old is permissible, so why not that the occurred knowledge be so, and let the occurrence of something be a reason for having knowledge of it. If philosophers say that the perfection of Al-Mighty Allah is to be the source of all things, His perfection is also to know all things (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Al-Jisr, n.d.).

3. The resurrection

Philosophers said that the soul remains eternal after death. People vary in degrees of pain and pleasure, as they vary in physical ranks. Happiness is obtained by perfection and purity, and perfection is achieved by knowledge and honesty in work. The soul preoccupied with the body and desires in this life, will suffer in the afterlife by lapses of psychological pleasure. Physical pleasures are despicable in addition to mental-spiritual pleasures. Man himself prefers mental pleasures more than sensual pleasures. Purifying self is done by work and worship. The self that persists in desire gets hurt for its inability to have moderate physical pleasure. Therefore, one must leave the physical pleasures and be content with Sharia. A happy person is the one

who combines the virtues of knowledge and work, while the unhappy person is the one who lacks these virtues. The person who has the virtue of work without knowledge will survive and be safe from the pain, but they will not be completely happy. Philosophers believe that the person who died is resurrected (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

According to Al-Ghazali, most of these issues are not contrary to Sharia. We do not deny that in the Hereafter, there are kinds of pleasures, as well as that we do not deny the survival of the soul when the body dies. This is known from the Sharia. Previously, we falsified philosophers' claims that this knowledge is obtained merely by logic. The issue that is contrary to Sharia is the denial of the resurrection, physical pleasures, and pains in paradise and hell. The philosophers argued that if the resurrection of the bodies is assumed, this could be happening by either:

- Combining the body parts and then the creation of life in it again;
- Resurrecting the body by collecting its parts as the soul remains existent after death; or
- Restoring the soul to the same body (Al-Ghazali, 1966).

These three sections are invalid. Firstly, the renewal of creation is the creation of the same soul not the body itself. Secondly, the collection of the body parts leads to the resurrection of parts and incomplete organs. Also, the parts of the body disappear and mix with other bodies. Thirdly, the self-restoration to more than one body refers to reincarnation, which is invalid.

Al-Ghazali objected to these sections by choosing the third one and approving it because the self remains after death as contained in the Glorious Qur'an:

- "Think not of those who are killed in the Way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have provided" (Al-Hilali & Khan, Chapter two: 169).

Self-restoration is possible to anybody, whether from the dead body or from the re-created one. What is important is the soul not the body, which is changing throughout life. Reincarnation is denied by Sharia, but the resurrection is not denied, and Al-Mighty Allah is able to manage things (Al-Ghazali, 1966; Al-Jisr, n.d.).

Ibn Rushd in the Peak of Confrontation

Ibn Rushd confronted the accusation, claims and evidences stated by Al-Ghazali. He refuted Al-Ghazali's accusations, defending the opinions and thoughts of philosophers. However, Ibn Rushd's statements brought him suffering as he glorified Aristotle. He was keen to defend Aristotle's thoughts and interpretations. Thus, the people reported that Al-Ghazali defended religion, but Ibn Rushd falsified him. The truth is that Ibn Rushd did not falsify Al-Ghazali, but he was not completely faithful when writing his book (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), and was not free of prejudice in the field of philosophy. Accordingly, he debated Imam Al-



Ghazali in all his responses to the accusations. He did not intend to invalidate the facts defended by Al-Ghazali, but to show Al-Ghazali's failure to understand the aims of philosophers (Al-Jisr, n.d.). Ibn Rushd explained the aims and interpretations of philosophers concerning the three issues, as mentioned earlier, as a faithful scholar without criticism or abuse. The title of Ibn Rushd's book is considered unfair and ill-informed, which is contrary to wisdom, right, loyalty, and politeness with Al-Mighty Allah (Abu Al-Ataa, 1985).

Al-Ghazali entitled his book as *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, believing that it invalidated their statements that denied the existence of Al-Mighty Allah by claiming those three issues. Whether he was right in understanding their claims or wrong (as Ibn Rushd believed), Al-Ghazali was a faithful man, defending Islam, calling for faith and clarifying the doubts of people (Ameen, 1969).

Now, it is the time to clarify the objections of Ibn Rushd, his statements and interpretations with regard to the three issues on which Al-Ghazali based his accusations to the philosophers, as follows:

First: the world is old

Ibn Rushd believed that there are three types of assets (two parties and a mediator): the first party is created from something and for something (i.e., from an object and for a reason) and has been created years ago. This is for the new things in our world. The Ash'aris and philosophers agreed to name this existent as a new object. The opposite party exists from nothing and for nothing and is not created before. This is Al-Mighty Allah, and the Ash'aris and philosophers agreed that He is old (Ash-Shahristani, 1967). The mediator is found from nothing and for nothing and is not created before. This refers to the whole universe, and it has some characteristics of the new and old objects. It is also called a new object by the Ash'aris, while the philosophers called it old. As long as the agreement is based on those three characteristics, the philosophers shall not be falsified because they violated the name or because they opposed the Ash'aris. Also, they should not be accused of atheism, even if they were wrong in saying the world is old as they were seeking a difficult issue (Ibn Rushd, 1986; Al-Jisr, n.d.).

Ibn Rushd also pointed out that the issue of "the world is old" does not contradict the texts of Sharia (the Glorious Qur'an). He emphasised that the logic that approves the principle of the existence of an old (Al-Mighty Allah) also approves that His characteristics and actions are old. Saying the world is old does not mean that it is not new at all, but it is always evolving (Ibn Rushd, 1986; Ash-Shammari, 2002).

Second: philosophers deny the knowledge of Al-Mighty Allah of partials

Ibn Rushd believed that Al-Ghazali abused the wise men in this concern. Ibn-Rushd argued that how do philosophers deny the knowledge of Al-Mighty Allah of partials, and they believe that the true vision predicting the future partials is obtained before the old knowledge. Thus, it is nonsense to falsify the philosophers in this issue (Ibn Rushd, 1986; Al-Jisr, n.d.).

Third: denial of the body resurrection

Ibn Rushd opined that scholars differed in understanding the verses on the resurrection of the body. On the one hand, Ash'aris understood the verses as they are and agreed upon the resurrection of the body. On the other hand, philosophers believed in the interpretation of those verses. Ibn Rushd's view is summarised in three proofs, as follows:

- Denial of the resurrection refers to disbelief. However, approving the resurrection itself and denying the resurrection of body is not considered disbelief.
- The assumption of belief by the public is based on the apparent meaning of verses. The same is applied to the bodily resurrection.
- If the first philosophers' who denied the resurrection of body were wrong, they would be excused; but if they were right, they would be appreciated, provided that they did not confuse the faith of people in the apparent meaning. Thus, Al-Ghazali's accusation of the atheism of philosophers in this issue is also false (Ibn Rushd, 1986).

Conclusion

Based on Ibn Rushd's explanation, the following points evaluate his claims in brief:

1. Ibn Rushd was right in defending philosophy, research, thinking, and the predecessors' lessons. However, he exaggerates by considering philosophy and predecessors' lessons as a religious duty.
2. Ibn Rushd was wrong in making inner and outer forms of Islamic law. So, he divided religion into two forms: its outer part is logical, and the inner one is misleading. It is a religion of majority as the simile contained in Islamic law is a means to understand Islamic law not to cover the truth.
3. Ibn Rushd was right in saying there is an agreement between religion and philosophy, if not both of them are right. But the question is: which philosophy is right? And which religion is right? Theoretically, this view is right, but it is arguable in reality.
4. Ibn Rushd believed that the interpretation of Islamic law is permissible and obligatory if it is proved to have a righteous philosophy and faith.
5. Ibn Rushd's response to Al-Ghazali's accusation of atheism for philosophers is considered to be both right and wrong. It is right in that philosophers deny Allah's knowledge of partials, and that the Islamic law deals with the issue of the old and new world and to falsify those who argued time is old. However, the Glorious Qur'an emphasised the resurrection



of bodies, paradise and hell. This emphasis leads some groups to resist Islam. Therefore, Muslim's denial of the resurrection of bodies is wrong (Qameer, 1986).

6. The core issue of the books (the incoherence of the incoherence) and (the incoherence of the philosophers) is the relation between religion and society, as has been discussed in Arabic Islamic history.

Based on the above, the right and wrong views of Ibn Rushd are clear, but he has partially attempted to make an agreement between wisdom and Islamic law and even to defend philosophy under the cover of legitimacy. However, both attempts did not succeed as there was no great Arabic philosopher after Ibn Rushd, who can reach a definite result as that of Ibn Rushd. Ibn Rushd argued that the religion of philosophers is based on faith in Al-Mighty Allah's existence and to worship Him. The doctrine of causation refuted by Al-Ghazali is the means that leads to a real knowledge of Al-Mighty Allah and His creatures (Ibn Rushd, 1986).

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