

# Factionalization of Political Parties in North Moluccas, Indonesia

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This article intends to describe some of the causes of factionalism and its impact on the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) for the five year period from 2014 to 2019 in North Moluccas Province, Indonesia. The analysis uses qualitative methods and Nvivo 12 Software through interviews, observations and documentation. The results of this study showed that PAN is struggling most in terms of the leader position, PKS experiences intense internal competition, and factionalism in PPP has resulted in the experience of greater welfare motivation. Factionalism in PAN has an impact on the conflict of relatively high structures, but experienced struggle in recording success in 2019 local elections, while the PPP and PKS recorded decreased votes and fewer representative seats as a result of the 2019 elections. PPP also is in an even more compromised because as it suffers the worst impact of Party Factionalism.

**Key words:** *Factionalism, Political Party, Islamic Party, North Moluccas.*

## Introduction

Studies on the causes and impacts of factionalism toward PAN, PKS, and PPP in specific areas are still rare and limited. The research is focused so far on the national sphere. Some research results at the national level were conducted by researchers about the clientele routes

and political personalities experienced by Islamic political parties, and others about the history of factionalism and the conflict of Islamic political parties in Indonesia (Ufen, 2008 ; Subekti, 2017). Other research (Fionna and Tomsa, 2017) found dynamics about the power of party politics and Islamic Party factions, resources, and protection, and the cultural faction and personalism of party leadership (Budiarti, 2017). The PAN, PKS and PPP parties, the focus of this research, suffered an identity crisis, pragmatism, factionalism, internal conflict, and weak leadership (Ufen, 2008) respectively. Recent studies (Berenschot, 2018) on economic clientele practice and the distribution of patronage power The Newest Indonesia Case (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019) found the faction of network clientele affects local elite conflicts.

Some problems of elite party factions found in PKS were party dualism leadership in PPP, and political parties that lost the orientation of progress in PAN. This phenomenon also affects party solidity and stability in the regions (Nurdin, dkk, 2019). Similarly, at the local level, public resource competition, the patronage of the ethnic elite in the portrayed political power (Wilson, 2015), is the fruit of elite involvement of political parties in conflict and ethnic divisions in North Moluccas previously in the seizure of resources and Governmental Office. The North Moluccas also was explained (Duncan, 2005 and Wilson, 2005) in research about the social and religious conflicts. Duncan and Wilson independently reviewed the theory (Boucek, 2012) of the causes of party factionalism and identified the following factors: first: electoral success and increasing competition; second: differing ideology; third: the struggle limited party position, and fourth: welfare motivation.

The impact on the (Placeholder1) party's survival is need to be cooperative, competitive, and have degenerative routes (Boucek, 2009). This study aims to determine the various dynamics of causes and the impact of factionalism on a party. The emergence of several political party factions has been attributed to the involvement of key actors of elite leaders and party members through the clientele factionism, tendencies, interests, and principles. The study also illustrates the impact of the factionalism of PAN, PKS, and PPP against various electoral arenas, parliaments, and party integrity in North Moluccas. Most of the involvement of faction actors was caused by the association of political actors in the struggle for key positions, party success, party resource dilemmas, and party welfare collectivity.

*Secondly*, the heterogeneity of actors based on different ethnic and ideological political identities can lead to internal conflicts. *Third*, the impact of party factionalism will lead to divisions and conflicts of structure, success, and failure in elections. Several previous studies of the political conflict in North Moluccas strengthened the reasons for the motivation of welfare, heterogeneity, and internal competition in ethnic conflicts and local elite patronage patterns. This assumption can be compared with the previous research results of public resource competition, the patronage of ethnic elites, in political power (Wilson, 2015). The

involvement of elite political parties in the conflict and ethnic divisions of the usurpation and political office of Government, ethnic and political identity (Bubandt, 2014), and, social and religious conflicts (Duncan, 2005). This study focuses on two crucial aspects, namely the cause and impact of the factionalism PAN, PKS, and PPP in North Moluccas. Idea dynamic of faction and its influence on the party structure and election results in the province as well as the impact experienced by political parties at the district and city level. Based on the results of the background identification of political parties, this study discusses two key questions:

- 1. What are the causes of factionalism factors that occur in PAN, PKS, and PPP in North Moluccas?*
- 2. What are the impacts of the factionalism experienced by PAN, PKS, and PPP in North Moluccas?*

## **Literature Review**

Factionalism is supported by a combination of faction actors, clicks, or encouraging voters (Zariski, 1960) who are typically organized, motivated, ideological, left-right cleavage, individual ambitions of political gangs, and have families (Scott et al, 1977). Whereas Shuck (1996), found a faction pattern through controlling common interests, and the authoritative decisions of the party. The pragmatic faction leadership characteristic can found in the motivating faction against access to the benefits of political-economy structural and functional resources in patron-client relationship (Brumfiel and Fox, 1994:p. 92).

Theorizing of factionalism by a new phenomenon in the form of clientele, tendencies, interests, and principles (Bettcher, 2009) is based on patronage in the context of the incentives of money, employment, and service. Tendencies are informal, have weak cohesion and discipline and are more collegial. The importance of a more organized patronage structure and policy is that the variants of the ethnic group-based clientele were constructed and moved through the power of a network of dynastic and ethnic patronage (Chhibber, 2013). This practice is considered detrimental to the institution of political parties and has adverse impact on the satisfaction of democracy (Wang, 2018). Factions contributed to the concentration of power, succession of leadership, party divisions, the formation of new parties, and the strengthening of the opposition culture (Musil and Bilgin, 2019) and the majority-minority of conflict (Levine, 2017). The factions also pursued the interests of the organization, similarity of identity, and public choice (Teiwes et al, 2019).

Meanwhile, The finding of this (Conger et al, 2019) study showed that the supporters of various cultures wanted address two needs to "seeking for job and positions" as well as public policy demand. The main Study (Boucek, 2012) showed that factionalisation of party politics

can be determined by four indicators; namely, 1) success and internal party competition; 2) heterogeneity in social background, ideological conflicts, and the risk of party splits; 3) struggle to attain limited key positions in party politics to support their career politics; 4) Motivation towards welfare goals in political parties can threaten the collectivity of party members. This study has similarities with the findings of (Poguntke, T., et al. 2016) showed that the party ideally has a resource that focuses on party organization, internal structure and decision making, member, staff, and Finance.

Weber, 2018) in his study, showed that the welfare motivation of party members is usually described by a resource-based model (party resources) such as a standard socio-economic model or by incentivizing the implication faction into three cycles cooperative, competitive, and degenerative. Previous research (Koger et al, 2010) explained that cooperative steps in the form of diversity accommodation, the cooperation of various party networks, politicians, donators, interest groups did not limit the rights of autonomy. However in the latest study (Ibenskas & Bolleyer, 2018) the indications are that there are variations of structural cooperative based on standard rules in various forms of the functional, rule-based coalition, unification to overcome fragmentation, volatility, and strengthening party cohesion. Whereas the failure of political parties is marked by weak competition, unstable coalitions between factions, and distorted public policies. Some of the other dominant factors to be considered are: collective instability, neglect of public resources, corruption, clientelism, patronage, and inconsistent party policies on public policy, weak internal institutionalization, erosion systems, hesitant and inconsistent (Benton, 2007).

The dualism of party leadership is a result of factional conflict. Leadership dualism undermines and obscures voter preferences and party policies in ambiguous situations, and threatens the unity of internal government (Lehrer & Lin, 2018). The newest Study (Ashindorbe and Nathaniel, 2019) showed that factional leadership drives the conflict between intra-party elite actors. Likewise, the same case was found in the results of the study (Ceron et al, 2019), which showed that party polarization has ignored the policy promise of leadership for its supporters in providing public goods. This can also reduce party solidarity and undermine the strength of political parties, policies, decision making, and setting internal party agendas (Ceron & Greene, 2019). Another study (Skoog & Karlsson, 2018) has shown that fragmentation also found in the internal party friend mixed ethnicity is motivated by inequality of income and resources as well as central-area relations. This phenomenon could evokes a series of ethnic populism practices in the political party in the region (Jenne, 2018), and diverse faction membership can give birth to militants, reformists, and opportunist factions (Göktuna, 2019).

Borz & Miguel's (2017) , study about elite factionalism described that it can weaken the party, election strategy, and become resource-intensive because factional leadership further


maintains the power of factions at the local level. While supporters of the party pursued more political benefits and incentives (Achury, 2018). Sandri & Amjahad (2005), proposed that leadership elections must be more open (inclusive) and that party policy be more open through intra-party democratization as the duration of affiliation, and loyalty. Also, parties need autonomy and are responsible for party supporters and must provide internal complaints procedures (Yahaya & Ibrahim, 2015). Direct practice through strengthening party members in aggregation with the government (Wolkenstein, 2017), political participation, competition, representation, responsiveness, and transparency (Rahat & Shapira, 2017) is essential. The other findings (Ignazi, 2018) proposed intra-party democracy was evidenced in three strategies, namely (1) party public image, (2) internal party work, and (3) performance and function of party representatives. The same was also found by Borz & Janda (2018), who stated that intra-party democracy was achieved through the inclusivity, diversity, deliberation, and diffusion process. The participation of party members strengthens party resources through party contribution funds (Koo, 2018).

Meanwhile the Close (2019,) showed that strong cohesion through the level of party structure from the central to the regional is a way of maintaining the internal integrity of the party. Cohesion produced through the compliance of party members on the party leadership ideology and the elite receive the power of the party at grassroots (Kukec, 2019). It can be found also in the resesarch (Friedman & Friedberg, 2019) that excessive personal investment in politics can damage party politics, weakening the institutional position of the party, and affecting the behavior patterns of the personal-oriented members. The findings of these studies (Pedersen & Rahat, 2019, Dodeigne & Pilet, 2019) showed that the impact of political personalism was addressed through an exclusive party's internal electoral mechanism.

## Methods

The presentation of this article uses the analysis of 5w + 1h, i.e., 1). What causes and effects of factionalism; 2). Anyone involved in the dynamics of Factionalism; 3). Why factionalism can occur; 4). When factionalism occurs; 5). Where the factional party took place; and 6) How factionalism occurs. This qualitative analysis utilizes NVivo12 Software to reveal the causes and impacts of factionalism toward PAN, PKS, and PPP in North Moluccas over the last five years (2014-2019). The research location is articulated in Figure 1 below.


**Figure 1.** Research Location, North Moluccas Province, Indonesian Territorial



The sources of data by interviews, observations, and documentation collection (Denscombe, 2007) are related to informants of the party members and also faction actors. The presentation begins by reviewing several theories in the Literature Review relating to the factionalism of the party, then formulating the problem and the techniques of collecting data utilizing interviews, observations, sourced/ written information from various mass media, books, and magazines, and documentation of other election results.


The PAN's informant includes the Ideological Faction: *Sahrin Hamid* and *Ikbal Mahmud*; Entrepreneur Faction: *Husni Bopeng* and *Baharullah Karim* and Professional Faction: *Majid Husen* and *Kasman Hi. Ahmad*. The PKS's informant base consists of the Idealist Faction: *Ridwan Husen* and *Alimin Muhammad*; Pragmatic Faction: *Abdul Gani Kasuba* and *Bahrain Kasuba*; and the Youth Faction: *Saiful Ahmad* and *Mochdar Bailussy*. The PPP's informant base consists of the Conservative Factions: *Muhammad Ridwan Tjan* and *Sofyan Abbas*; the Faction of Renewal: *Salim Halik* and *Sadiq Diadon*. An interview to gather information re the causes of faction dynamics includes as follows: success in elections and internal competition, heterogeneous ideology, the struggle for party positions, and welfare motivation. While the impact of factionalism relates to three aspects: 1) Increased representation of the seat in the elections, 2) declining representative seats based on election results, and 3) Division and conflict structure. *The coding* process utilizes the NVivo12 application program by dividing into two *Nodes* the cause and impact of political party factionalism (see Figure 2 below).

**Figure 2.** Connection Map in Party Factionalism



Data processing techniques regarding the causes and effects of party factionalism using NVivo Software is conducted by linking the contents of interviews with Nodes and Cases that contain political parties, factions, and informants. Data processing techniques and determination of correlation between causes and impacts of factionalism is achieved by creating a data code utilizing various data sources including interviews, websites, secondary data Party reports, Newspapers, magazines books and others. The Code technique Data interviews have been classified according to Nodes about Causes and Impacts, and were then correlated with each informant party's Factions and political parties. The next stage is data visualization through the Group Query and Crosstab Query methods. This methodology aims to determine the relationship between the data and the object of study, and produce graphic images needed in data analysis and drawing conclusions and is represented in Figure 3 below.

**Figure 3.** Stages and Data Analysis of Party Factionalism



## Findings


### *Party Success and Internal Competition*

These study findings outline four factors causing party factionalism experienced by PAN, PKS, and PPP in North Moluccas, Indonesia. The factionalism in political parties is caused by internal success and competition, heterogeneity and ideological conflicts, fighting for limited party key positions, and welfare motivations to control party resources. As a result, political parties will face two problems regarding the collectivism and individual behavior of members.

Firstly, PAN experiences internal competition between the Ideological Faction and the Entrepreneur Faction which took place in the recruitment of candidates of the 2013 Governor Election. This is very interesting because the struggle for key positions aims to facilitate access to internal competition. Internal competition triggered the creation of two ideological factions and the employer faction that targeted the PAN towards the recruitment of the candidate of governor and vice in North Moluccas in 2013. The ideological faction was more loyal to the party, while the businessman faction had greater monetary resources but was more pragmatic.

The same case was also found in the PKS. The PKS political movements were supported by Islamic political values and relied on the ability of a level of cadre Tarbiyah Islamiyah. Conflicts in the PKS with the elite competition became heated ahead of the 2018 Governor Election, and this spawned internal polarization between Abdul Gani Kasuba (incumbent candidate) and his young brother Muhammad Kasuba (a Former Regent of South Halmahera Regency). Data findings show that positioning of the PKS was harmed through the rivalry of strong patronage between the PKS elite. Internal competition conflict in PKS has sacrificed internal integrity as reflected in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4.** Internal Competition



Other internal competition emerged from the young people faction under the carriage of Saiful Ahmad (a member of the Parliament of North Moluccas 2009-2014, and some also from the Ternate House of representative Mohdar Bailussy Ahmad Jaiz Meradji (East Halmahera), and Karnawi Hasani (South Halmahera). All of them were dismissed from Party membership in 2018, and were political victims of internal conflict in the rivalry between Muhammad Kasuba and Abdul Gani Kasuba.

Conflict in PPP since 2013 has been impacted by internal competition between Salim Halik (Renewal Faction) and Muhammad Ridwan Tjan (Conservative Faction) and involved ethnic strength and leadership motivation. Both of them not only had leadership motivation but also competed to become members of the House Representative of North Moluccas Province through electoral districts of Ternate City and West Halmahera Regency. In 2018 Governor Election, Salim Halik and the Renewal Faction members supported Burhan Abdurrahman and Ishak Djamaludin. Conservative Faction supported the candidate Ahmad Hidayat Mus and Rivai Umar, while the youth movement Ka'bah supported Muhammad Kasuba and Majid Husen.

### ***Heterogeneity of Ideology***

Political Formation of PAN is more open and heterogeneous, and triggered internal conflicts in the years 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2018. Factions that have been in power include the

Ideological Faction, the Businessmen Faction, and the Professional Faction. The politicians from the Ideological Faction were mostly from HMI, Muhammadiyah, and youth organizations. Businessman Faction members were predominantly from entrepreneurial backgrounds, and the professional faction contained a mixed politician faction between academia, consultants, and other pensionary bureaucratic officials.


The party PKS members are highly heterogeneous comprising various ethnicities, factions, formal and informal party support organizations. The rear batter of the party members came from the Indonesia Muslim Students Action Union (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*, KAMMI), Campus Dakwah Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*, LDK), Abnaul Alkhaairat, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah School, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The ethnic political power of Tobelo-Galela, Tidore, Ternate, The Makean and Kayoa ethnic, Bugis-Makassar overseas, Gorontalo, Buton, and Java. Formal groups and informal organizations are more controlled by Muhammad Kasuba alongside the PKS Elite Circle Area of Idealis Faction (Faksi Idealis). While Abdul Gani Kasuba and Bahrain Kasuba are in the Pragmatic Faction whose followers consist of a network of ethnic patronage, loyalist bureaucrats and local Chinese businessmen. The other young people's faction of Saiful Ahmad contains a collection of PKS young politicians Fahri Hamzah.

Other political parties, such as PPP, are heterogeneity dominated only ethnic Ternate and have unofficial support of the Ternate Sultanate's indigenous institutions in Conservative Factions, who are led by Ridwan Tjan. This action has provoked the reaction of supporters of Salim Halik from various ethnic-based regions of Makean-Kayoa, Tidore, Bacan, and Tobelo-Galela. Also, this party represented many different backgrounds of party member organizations. In general, the Renewal Faction is a gathering place for politicians who have risen through the ranks of political parties and community organizations. For example, Salim Halik raised in GPK and HMI, Sadik Diadon in GPK and PII, Wahdah Zainal Imam Imam in HMI, Ridwan Elyas in DDII and Muhammadiyah.

Figure 5 below illustrates The Treemap Heterogeneity of Ideology. The strengthened resistance of the PKS Youth Faction against the Elderly dominated by the Idealist Faction and the Pragmatic Faction. The PKS Youth Faction has a stronger ideological diversity. The same fact can also be seen in the PAN Businessman Faction who want a more open and diverse party. The strengthening of factional heterogeneity in PKS and PAN can be understood in the diverse backgrounds of faction ideology. In general, the three parties, PAN, PKS and PPP actually have a diversity of ideologies inherent in party membership. The heterogeneity of PAN is more marked by the clash between religious ideologies vis-a-vis and capitalist ideologies in the form of profit orientation pursued through the regulation of party political policies. PKS is more complicated because ideological conflicts are followed by the influence of the age of the Old vs. Young, openness vs. closure, idealist vs. pragmatic. Even ethnic

tension and political involvement colour the dynamics of PKS. While the PPP ideology illustrates the waning phenomenon of the power of traditional Islamic politics in the party structure.

**Figure 5.** The Treemap Heterogeneity of Ideology



### ***Struggle for Party Key Position***

This point illustrates the findings regarding the dynamics of the faction in the fight for the key position of the chairman, secretary, treasurer, and chairman of the electoral winning agency (BAPPILU). Several factions competed for the position of party leader. The party chairperson's position was contested because it has high authority in determining party policy and powers. Further, the Secretary, Treasurer, and Electoral Agency (*Badan Pemenangan Pemilu-BAPPILU*) also influence supporting the chairman of the party. The four strategic positions as a determinant in decision making, party administration, party finances, access resources, and the management of recruitment of both legislative candidates and regional head candidates are crucial to operation.


All PAN's factions struggled for the party leadership from 2011, 2013, 2015 to 2018. The chaos was utilized by DPP PAN to thrust Sahrin Hamid, one of the representatives of members Central Board PAN, to North Moluccas to replace the Imran. Sahrin not only fixed the internal party but also built a new power in the future of the prospective governor in 2013. New stage conflict emerged between Sahrin Hamid (ideological faction) and Umar Bopeng



(entrepreneur faction) through extraordinary deliberation beginning in 2013. Many faction members switched to Nasdem party after losing the key position scramble. Over the years, the position of Sahrin increasingly sought the position of his political patron in Jakarta, Hatta Rajasa, failed to fight the election of the chairman PAN's Central Board. Sahrin was laid off in 2015 and replaced Majid Husen (Professional Faction). Although rejected from within the structure of the party, Majid Husen remained insistent on running for deputy governor in pairs with Muhammad Kasuba of the PKS. The internal conflict strengthened during the phase of Governor elections, and the deputy governor took position from 2017-2018. Majid was again impeached by the internal meeting of the regional leadership without Majid's presence. This dynamic is answered by Majid dismissing the Chairman of the party consideration Tribunal, the General Secretary, several deputy chairmen and deputy secretaries who were not loyal. Then Majid appointed several newcomers as party officials. The new mainstream was dominated by HMI activists, IMM, lecturers, consultants, and former regional bureaucratic officers.

The struggle for limited key positions in the internal PKS is mostly determined by the authority of the central leadership and is based on great support through the internal selection of the Leader candidate, performed synchronously throughout the county and the city. Another cause for this was that PKS fired Muslih Haryanto, who was the head of the South Halmahera PKS party as chairman and denied his party membership because he was not loyal to Muhammad Kasuba. He preferred Abdul Gani Kasuba Muhammad Kasuba in the 2018 Governor Election. The struggle for key positions in PPP is not through internal mechanisms. It has an impact on the internal fractions of the party, which is increasingly weakened by leadership dualism in the centre, which also worsened the PPP integrity in North Moluccas. Leadership dualism is further one of the original forms of usurption of limited power formations in number. Although the government does not necessarily accept its formalities, this leadership dualism has influenced PPP's failure in unification, Islah, and election.

**Figure 6.** Struggle For Party Key Position



It can be seen in Figure 6 above that the series of struggles for party leaders are dominated by PAN and PPP. Whereas the struggle for PKS party leader was relatively smaller because the party already had procedures and internal Leader election mechanisms and management. The PAN struggle and replacement of party leaders is more open, dynamic, and even pragmatic. The presence of Madjid Husen, a former local government bureaucrat in the Professional Faction carriage actually reflects the pattern of party leadership recruitment even though it must ignore party cadres. Under the leadership of the Professional Faction, PAN experienced turmoil throughout 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. Conflict and struggle for party leadership led to a positive direction for PAN. This was marked by success in the election (See Impact of Factionalization and Figure 10). On the contrary, the conflict over the struggle of the party leader has an impact on the reduction in the acquisition of PPP candidates in the 2019 election. In addition, the struggle for the party's key position has divided PPP in leadership dualism.

### ***Party Resources Motivation***

During the reign of Imran Djumadil, the motivation to pursue welfare and resources through key positions in the party and DPRD. However, entrepreneurship in the PAN has started to weaken since the year 2014 after failure in the usurpation of the 2013 party's head position. In




addition to healthy internal competition in the PKS, prosperity encouragement also dye the PKS in the last five years. The success of PKS drove the welfare and mastery of the party's resources through the 2013 Governor Election, 2014 legislative election, and regional head election (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah-PILKADA) of North Halmahera and Sula Regency in 2015. The most exciting faction is the two factions in the "Kasuba brothers" Circle. The two "Kasuba brothers" destroyed the success and togetherness of PKS. Ridwan Husen, Chairperson of North Maluku PKS, believes Abdul Gani Kasuba and Bahrain Kasuba, both who have abundant resource power and robust political networks, have not fulfilled their promise to prosper and grow PKS.

Abdul Gani Kasuba is considered more pragmatic and more concerned with his group than adherence to the PKS's Central Board decision. This attitude demonstrates the inconsistency of the PKS cadres who are not sincere to allow Muhammad Kasuba, his siblings, who have been carried by the PKS. The other party, PPP, has limited resources and is sourced from legislative membership fees, government contributions, and incentives obtained from party coalitions through regional head elections. However the financial source flows into the hands of the PPP elite without functioning in raising the party. As the conflict of leadership dualism hit, PPP increasingly lost its political capital power. The conflict of interest orientation between the renewal faction is that it further encourages the welfare of collective asa strong challenge of conservative factions. The cultivation of conservative factions prioritizes the interests of the family circle and Ternate ethnic domination.

Factors causing factionalization of political parties actually have a clear and measurable relationship as can be seen in Figure 7 below. The relationship between the factions and the dynamics that were produced has been explained previously above and it can be seen from the results of the PAN Professional Factions analysis that is identical to the "Key Position of Party Struggle". This is marked by the dynamics of the struggle for the position of party chairman throughout 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. While the dynamics had previously occurred throughout 2011 and 2013 which involved the Ideological Faction and the Entrepreneur Faction. The dynamics of the Youth Faction can be seen when fighting against the ruling PKS Party controlled by the Idealist Faction. The PKS Youth needs that the party must be open, more diverse, giving freedom in differences of thought.

**Figure 7.** Party Resources Motivation




The dismissal of several PKS Youth faction activists has pushed PKS to be unfriendly with a diversity of ideologies. Another PKS faction, the Pragmatic Faction has greater capital strength. This political force has pragmatic ways of internal competition with the Idealist Faction. The high motivation of welfare of the pragmatic faction encouraged them to compete with the Idealist faction in the 2018 Governor Election in North Maluku. Related, Abdul Gani Kasuba from the Pragmatic Faction had to fight using the PDI-P and PKPI against his biological brother, Muhammad Kasuba, who was carried by the PKS, PAN and Gerindra parties. Whereas PPP is colored by conflicts between the Renewal Faction and the Conservative Faction relating to 3 aspects, namely ideological heterogeneity, Party Resource Motivation, and Internal Competition.

Factors causing factionalization of political parties actually have a clear and measurable relationship as can be seen in Figure 8 below. The relationship between the factions and the dynamics that were produced have been explained previously above, it can be seen from the results of the PAN Professional Factions analysis that is identical to the "Key Position of Party Struggle". This is marked by the dynamics of the struggle for the position of party chairman throughout 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. While the dynamics had previously occurred throughout 2011 and 2013 which involved the Ideological Faction and the Entrepreneur Faction. The dynamics of the Youth Faction can be seen when fighting against the ruling PKS Party controlled by the Idealist Faction. The PKS Youth needs that the party

must be open, more diverse, giving freedom in differences of thought. The dismissal of several PKS Youth faction activists has pushed PKS to be adverse to a range of ideologies.

**Figure 8.** Item Clustered Party and Causes of Factionalization By Word Similarity

**Items Clustered By Word Similarity**



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Various findings through several factors causing party factionalisation can be seen through Figure 8 which displays Item Clustered by Word Similarity. This analysis makes it easier to position relations between parties and factions with factors that cause factionalism. Figure 8 shows that PAN Professional Faction is more in the dynamics of Struggle party Key Position. While the Heterogeneity Factor of ideology is more inherited colored by The Youth PKS Faction. On the other hand, Pragmatic Faction tends to be the Resaource Motivation party. The faction was also with the Idealist Faction dominating the Internal Competition in the 2018 governor election. While the Businessmen and Ideology Factions actually overshadowed the dynamics in the internal PAN. Likewise, the Conservative Faction and the PPP Renewal Faction also overshadowed ideological heterogeneity dynamics, party welfare motivations and internal competition. Even so, the percentage is very small.

## **Discussion**

### ***Impact of Factionalism: Cleavage and Structural Conflicts***

PAN's factionalism is dynamic, open and competitive. The internal conflict of PAN through the capture of the key position of the party chairman is marked by the change of leadership from the ideological faction, the businessman faction, and the professional faction that puts the party at most reaping the division of the party structure. The impact of this key position scramble affects the divisions and conflicts of structures. Although in high party conflicts, the professional faction can manage conflicts well. That is, the impact of key position scramble rotated the structure of the party, experiencing an elite cleavage in strengthening the new structure.

Since 2016, Majid Husen overhauled the more stable, cohesive, and participatory structure of the party through a broader, representative, and democratic decision-making pattern for internal integrity of the party. Party cohesion was produced through the compliance of party members with the party leadership ideology and elite receiving the power of the party in grassroots. A few steps did Majid Husen with the Stability of the Identity of the Party sub-Group and developed the democratization of Intra-party. The cleavage and structural conflict of PKS was caused by the high internal competition "Kasuba Brothers," which led to two distinct party orientations and constituents. Muhammad Kasuba is an accurate representation of the party's struggle, while Abdul Gani Kasuba is more pragmatic and open through the power of clientele and the patronage network. The patronage pattern used by Abdul Gani Kasuba was more organized. His various policies in the flow of patron-client based ethnic

group relations, which built and moved through the power of a network of dynastic and ethnic patronage.

PPP's factionalism in the last five years has eroded the party's image as an Islamic Ummah party. The impact of factionalism has caused Ridwan Tjan to behave more personally and to obscure party orientation in voter decisions. Ideally, the religious, moral authority must be framed by ethnic diversity. PPP as a collection of politicians who come from various organizational ideologies but are silenced by their personalist leadership style. Personal power has ignored and hurt other faction groups. This step impacts the internal PPP institutional position to be weaker. It affects the behavior patterns of politicians who are personally-oriented versus partisans. Consequently, many voters tend to misunderstand the ambiguity of which party reflects the best option. Party leadership dualism has weakened connectivity between selector preference, and government policy tends to be reduced or even broken.

**Figure 9.** Impacts of Party Factionalization




Figure 9 above illustrates through comparison the impact of factionalization of parties that occurred on PAN, PKS and PPP. Cleavage and Conflicts in the party structure are more dominant when compared to the success or failure of the party in elections. Although PAN occupies the highest position in terms of the effects of party cleavage and conflicts, it is more successful under the leadership of Majid Husen from the Professional Faction. Conversely, based on Figure 9, PKS reaps the negative effects of Cleavage and party structure conflict. This has an effect on the 2019 election results where the results are worse than in the

previous 2014 elections. Likewise, PPP experienced worse things than PAN and PKS. The percentage of disunity and conflict in the PPP structure is also relatively high followed by its failure to win a representative seat of the North Maluku provincial DPRD in the 2019 election. PPP's problem lies in the poor leadership of the Conservative faction, Ridwan Tjan.

These points analyze the impact of factionalism on the 2018 Governor Election and the 2019 legislative election result. Of course, this short description compares all three parties in two different electoral periods. Comparative data 2018 Governor Election, 2015 district leader elections, and 2104 and 2019 legislator elections. These different outcomes were influenced by the party's internal factionalism that had both positive and negative impact. Election results describe the ability of a political party in the route of Factionalism. The electability of a PAN-legislative candidate is strengthened compared to PKS and PPP in the 2019 elections. The dynamic, open, and competitive PAN factionalism has positively impacted the strength of the party's elite. This condition strengthens the PAN such that it is more cohesive, stable, and reliable in consolidating electoral winnings through a tiered party structure. PAN increased votes, and won four legislative DPRD provincial seats and maintained 13 parliamentary seats in Regencies and Cities 2019 elections.


### ***Impact of Success and Failure in Election***

The adverse impact of factionalism in the 2018 Governor Election has reduced the PKS legislative seats. The winning Abdul Gani Kasuba and Ali Yasin in the 2018 Governor Election worsened the PKS's electability in the 2019 election. The impact on the PKS is that it has lost three provincial legislative seats, including two of the previous 16 seats. Similarly, PPP leader dualism affects the results of the 2019 elections. Based on Figure 10 below, comparative data about the success of the three parties in the 2019 elections, PAN reached 63%, PKS 27%, and, PPP only 9%. PAN's high success is characterized by its ability to increase seat acquisition in the North Maluku Province DPRD and to be able to maintain the number of representative seats in the Regency and City DPRD. In contrast, PKS lost 3 seats in the Provincial DPRD from 5 seats in the 2014 election results, and lost 2 seats in the Regency and City. PPP experienced a worse condition due to a decrease in the acquisition of representative seats from 10 to 7 seats in the Regency and City DPRD. PPP also failed in the 2019 election, after failing to lose the one representative seat in the North Maluku Province DPRD. PAN has a 63% success rate, while the failure is only 10 percent. The success of PKS in the 2019 election was 27%, while the failure was 39%. PPP's ability is only 9% in getting a seat, while the failure is 50%.

This defeat is attributed to the pattern of adverse patronage of the PKS in the 2018 Governor Election and the 2019 Elections due to the adverse impact on the satisfaction of Democracy. The second showdown of the faction has damaged the PKS's concentration on the Kasuba

brothers. It eliminated Bahrain Kasuba from the PKS and instigated the switch to the South Halmahera of the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI). A consequence of the succession of leadership, party divisions, was the formation of a new party. The phenomenon of conflict between the brothers of the Kasuba faction affects political interests, collective identity, and public choice. PKS also reaped the effects of the defeat in the 2019 elections. Conflicts Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba have influenced the choice of PKS constituents. Their supporters still want to seek office and demand public policy. Success and failure in 2019 election is summarized in Figure 10 below.

**Figure 10.** Success and Failure in 2019 Election



As a result, all PPP legislative candidates failed in the Provincial parliamentary election. The other failure that PPP experienced was a decreased number of representatives from 10 to 7 seats only. PKS and PPP fell in the 2019 election caused by volatility of voter behavior as a direct impact of factionalism, and that further pursues political benefits and incentives. The voter switching from PKS and PPP to the other parties indicates the party's failures in fulfilling their policy promises and provision of public goods. PKS elite internal competition has reduced party solidity in the face of the 2019 elections. It has damaged the party's power in policy-making, decision-making, and internal agenda.

## Conclusion

This study can be concluded by referring to the findings and with a discussion. Various causes of factionalization impacted the party structure and election results. *Firstly*, PAN, despite facing the leadership of the party since the years 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2018, the heterogeneity of the party was still at an average rate. Even the low motivation in pursuing welfare and party resources lowered tensions against the various factions and heterogeneity of actors. PAN's success in maintaining the number of representative seats in the DPRD Regency and City, and increasing seat numbers in the DPRD provincial as an exception. The higher the fighting for the party key position, the more impact in cleavage and structural conflicts. Nevertheless, the competition for the key position has leveraged the dynamics of positive heterogeneity. PAN politicians can manage their Structural conflicts. This is evidenced by the ability of the party chairman to utilize heterogeneity as a positive force in collecting managers and party members from various background.

*Secondly*, the intra-elite PKS competition has an effect on the declining vote and seats in the 2019 elections. The biggest failure of PKS is the inability to reconcile two influential, dominant political figures in PKS who have a strong patronage relation at the grass-root level. Another failure was the impact of intra-elite competition with the loss of 3 seats in the Provincial Legislative Election. PKS, as well experienced failure due to high welfare motivation that ruined the party's collectivism. The other PKS failure is closely related to the loss of party resources contested through welfare motivation controlled by the "Kasuba Brothers" through strategic positions in the government. Conflicts and divisions in the structure of PKS are still low. PKS can not to overcome the impact of high internal competition and is dominated by patronage models in the large capital networks played by pragmatic factions. Other PKS failures are caused by the fact that it has the worst-managed party heterogeneity.

*Thirdly*, the internal competition of PPP is low and limited. The party is only utilized by local elites who follow guaranteed party recommendations. PPP has always been pro-active in providing support to the prospective partner's head but unable to increase the collective welfare. PPP Welfare motivation is limited among the Rusdy Hanafi family, the chairman of the party, and several colleagues. The dualism of leaders also influences PPP's defeat in the 2019 election. The impact experienced by PPP was a resultant tension between the Conservative Faction and the Reform Faction. Comparisons of causes and effects of party factionalism are beneficial to determine the root of the problem occurring within the party. The percentage of PAN is still normal and the rate of its impact was higher in the party's success in the 2019 election. In contrast, the PKS has a top cause percentage that had a direct effect on party failure in the 2019 elections. Another case with PPP it that is has a higher cause rate and a this has a negative influence on the party structure and was a factor in the



failure of the 2019 election results.



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